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Abstract 
Despite its significant role in the society, ownership has received little research attention 
from social psychology. Understanding ownership as a form of people-object relations has 
important implications for social cognition, as the relations between people and objects share 
similar mechanisms with the relations between people and other social entities. Adopting an 
associative approach to relations, the present research investigates how ownership influences 
self-object association—mental associations between the owner’s self and the owned objects 
in the owner’s associative network. It is argued that the formation of self-object associations 
is gated by the levels of congruence or incongruence between the owner’s active 
representation of the self and those of the objects. In five experimental studies, the effects of 
ownership on self-object associations were examined in two types of ownership scenario. In 
the mere-ownership scenario, participants received an object randomly selected from two 
alternatives as gift. In the ownership-by-choice scenario, participants were free to choose an 
object from two alternatives as gift. Objects with either positive or negative valence were 
included, under the assumption that they are evaluatively congruent or incongruent, 
respectively, with the self. In the mere-ownership scenario, it was predicted that the 
formation of self-object associations should be determined passively by pre-existing levels of 
self-object congruence, assuming the information processing of the alternatives should be at 
a minimal level. In the ownership-by-choice scenario, it was predicted that the formation of 
self-object associations should be determined by choice, assuming choice-related information 
processing creates self-object congruence for the chosen object. Consistent with the 
predictions, the findings show a moderating effect of object valence on self-object 
associations in the mere-ownership scenario, in that ownership effects on self-object 
associations were found for positive objects but not for negative objects. The findings also 
show an ownership-by-choice effect on self-object association for negative objects, 
indicating choice-induced changes in the representations of the chosen object. Additional 
findings indicate that such changes are caused by pre-choice information processing. The 
findings are discussed in light of the psychology of ownership, choice, and the self. 
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1 Theoretical Background 
1.1 Ownership and self-object association 
Ownership, one of the oldest forms of human-object relations, plays important roles in 
various domains of the society (e.g., economics, law). It has, however, received little 
research attention within the area of social psychology. After all, social psychologists 
care about the relations between humans, while ownership is about the relations between 
humans and objects. However, the ways people interact with objects has always been 
similar to the ways they interact with others. For example, people can assign human 
characteristics to non-human objects (Epley, Waytz, & Cacioppo, 2007), form 
impressions about objects (Zeithaml, 1988), develop trust and loyalty to objects (e.g., 
brand names, Chaudhuri & Holbrook, 2001), and get emotionally attached to objects 
(Frost & Hartl, 1996). The study of human-object relations, therefore, may reveal 
psychological mechanisms that can be applied to various topics in social psychology 
including attribution, impression formation, attitudes, and close-relationships.  
One particular topic that is relevant to the psychology of ownership is the self. The idea 
that possessions contribute to the owner’s self and identity can be traced back to James 
(1890), who defined a person’s self as the “sum of things that the person calls his or hers” 
(p. 291). Influenced by the social-identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1986) and the 
symbolic self-completion theory (Wicklund & Gollwitzer, 1981), Belk (1988) argued that 
people’s possessions are extensions of their self, as the possessions help them to maintain 
their identity, achieve a sense of continuity, and maintain a sense of the past. 
Consumption as a way to expand one’s possessions, therefore, has important self-
regulation functions such as boosting the consumer’s public self-image (Pettit & 
Sivanathan, 2011; Sivanathan & Pettit, 2010).  
The research on the mere-ownership effect has shown that people tend to evaluate an 
owned object more positively than an equivalent but non-owned object (e.g., Beggan, 
1992; Huang, Wang, & Shi, 2009). A similar effect can be seen in the name-letter effect, 
which indicates that individuals evaluate their own name letters more positively than the 
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other letters (Nuttin, 1985, 1987). The research on implicit egotism further indicates that 
the positive evaluation of one’s name letters can transfer to other people, places, and even 
influence people’s career choices (Jones, Pelham, Carvallo, & Mirenberg, 2004; Jones, 
Pelham, & Mirenberg, 2002; Pelham, Mirenberg, & Jones, 2002) 1.  
Beggan (1992) argued that the mere-ownership effect on evaluations of the owned 
objects is driven by self-enhancement motivation. A key factor, according to Beggan 
(1992), is the psychological association between the owner and the owned object, which 
allows the positive evaluations of an owned object to fulfill the goal of self-enhancement. 
Similarly, Greenwald and Banaji (1995) proposed that mental associations between a 
person’s self and a concept allow for the automatic transference of positive valence from 
the self to the concept, which subsequently improves the person’s positive feelings 
towards the concept.  
According to the associative approach, ownership creates a mental association between 
the owner’s self and a concept representing the owned object, and automatic valence 
transference from the self to the concept leads to increased liking of the owned object. In 
support of the notion of automatic valence transference, Gawronski, Bodenhausen, and 
Becker (2007) found that individuals’ automatic evaluations of the self were positively 
correlated with their automatic evaluations of owned objects and uncorrelated with their 
automatic evaluations of non-owned objects. Walther and Trasselli (2003) found that 
positive or negative self-evaluations caused by bogus feedback were transferred to the 
evaluations of a fictitious person with whom participants were arbitrarily associated. 
Similarly, research on associative self-anchoring, (e.g., LeBel & Gawronski, 2007; Roth 
& Steffens, in press) has shown that individuals’ automatic evaluations of the self were 
positively correlated with their automatic evaluations of ingroups and uncorrelated with 
their automatic evaluations of outgroups. Gramzow and Gaertner (2005) found explicit 
                                                 
1
 Simonsohn (2011a, 2011b) re-analyzed the data of this study and concluded that the effects reported 
might be spurious and caused by ‘‘a combination of cohort, geographic, and ethnic confounds as well as 
reverse causality’’ (2011a, p. 1). 
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self-esteem predicted explicit ingroup favoritism. In these cases, the co-variations 
between the individuals’ evaluations of the self and their evaluations of the owned 
objects, the associated persons, or the affiliated groups are considered as mediated by the 
mental associations between the individuals’ selves and the respective concepts 
(Greenwald & Banaji, 1995; Walther & Trasselli, 2003).  
Although mental associations between people’s selves and other concepts are considered 
as a key mediator in attitudes, stereotypes, and self-esteem (Greenwald & Banaji, 1995), 
they have received little research attention (for an exception, see Gawronski et al., 2007). 
The present research aims to study the construct in the context of ownership. The goal of 
the present research is to investigate how ownership influences the formation of mental 
associations between owners’ selves and the owned objects. Adopting an associative 
approach from the unified theory2 (Greenwald, Banaji, Rudman, Farnham, Nosek, & 
Mellott, 2002), self-object associations are defined as facilitatory links between the node 
of self and that of an object in an associative network of social knowledge. Drawing on 
key premises of the unified theory, a model of self-object association formation in 
ownership scenarios is proposed. As will be elaborated in the next section, the key 
assumption of the model is that the formation of self-object associations is guided by two 
operating principles of the associative network, which are triggered by the levels of 
congruence or incongruence between the owners’ active representations of the selves and 
of the owned objects. 
1.2 Self-object association formation 
1.2.1 Propositions vs. associations 
Propositions are beliefs about the state of affairs in the world (De Houwer, 2014). 
Propositions contain information about relations between concepts (Lagnado, Waldmann, 
Hagmayer, & Sloman, 2007), are subject to syllogistic rules and logical principles, and 
                                                 
2
 The full name is the unified theory of implicit attitudes, stereotypes, self-esteem, and self-concept. The 
term “unified” is used, as the theory provides an overarching framework that explains these different 
phenomena in social psychology.  
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can be judged as true or false (Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2006). It is postulated that 
when people learn about their prospective or factual ownership of certain objects, their 
perceptions of the ownership scenarios lead to logical inferences of ownership 
propositions, such as “I will own this object” or “this object is mine”.  
In contrast, associations are facilitatory links between nodes that represent concepts 
(Greenwald et al., 2002). Associations do not contain relation information or truth value, 
do not follow logical principles, and instead are subject to the principle of automatic 
spread of activation (Greenwald et al., 2002; Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2006). The 
activation of one concept in an association should automatically lead to the activation of 
the other concept, regardless of the truth value of the proposition that can be inferred 
from the association (Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2006).  
 
Figure 1.1. A sample structure in the associative network of social knowledge. 
Adapted from “A Unified Theory of Implicit Attitudes, Stereotypes, Self-esteem, 
and Self-concept,” by A. G. Greenwald, M. R. Banaji, L. A. Rudman, S. D. 
Farnham, B. A. Nosek, & D. S. Mellott, 2002, Psychological Review, 109, p. 5. 
Copyright 2002 by the American Psychological Association.  
According to the unified theory (Greenwald et al., 2002), mental associations are formed 
and stored in a large associative network of social knowledge, in which social 
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psychological concepts (e.g., the self, others, social groups, and traits) are represented as 
interconnected nodes. Associations between nodes allow for the automatic spread of 
activation between different concepts, and they differ in strength in terms of the potential 
of a node to activate another node. As a key configuration of the associative network, 
Greenwald et al. suggested that the node representing “me” is located at the center of the 
person’s associative network, as depicted in Figure 1.1, and has a large number of 
associations with other concepts such as traits (e.g., strong) and roles (e.g., father). 
Moreover, the associative network contains the so-called “bipolar-opposite nodes” (p. 6), 
which represent pairs of categorical or evaluative concepts that are semantically or 
affectively opposite to each other. Two examples, as depicted in Figure 1.1, are positive 
and negative valence and the genders of male and female.  
1.2.2 Mediators of self-object associations 
According to Greenwald and Banaji (1995), the associations between a person’s self and 
other social entities can be naturally mediated or forced. Naturally-mediated associations 
are formed on the basis of pre-existing similarities between concepts. In implicit egotism 
research (Jones et al., 2004; Jones et al., 2002; Pelham et al., 2002), for example, the 
associations between people and other people, places, or jobs are naturally mediated by 
people’s name letters (e.g., the letter d in Daniel and dentist) or birth dates (e.g., a 
stranger wearing a jersey numbered as one’s date of birth). Beggan (1992) suggested a 
similar mechanism, that the psychological association between an owner and an owned 
object can be mediated by their shared features such as the person’s date of birth. 
Similarity-attraction effects indicate that people develop positive attitudes towards others 
that are similar to them in economic status (Byrne, Clore, & Worchel, 1966), self-concept 
(Griffitt, 1966), attitudes, values, and beliefs (Berscheid, 1994), and personality (Klohnen 
& Luo, 2003). The improved positive attitudes might be the outcomes of self-other 
associations (e.g., through automatic valence transference) that are mediated by the 
perceived similarities between people’s selves and other people.  
Forced self-other associations, in contrast, are formed due to situational pressures on the 
associative network. The pressures can come from different types of sources. The co-
occurrence of two concepts such as the conditioned stimulus and the unconditioned 
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stimulus in evaluative conditioning effects (for a review, see De Houwer, Thomas, & 
Baeyens, 2001) is a type of source. In a study by Perkins and Forehand (2012), a single 
co-occurrence of a fictional brand name and logos near participants’ Facebook pages was 
found sufficient in creating self-brand associations for the participants. Another type of 
source of situational pressures is approaching behaviours. Research by Kawakami and 
colleagues (e.g., Kawakami, Phills, Steele, & Dovidio, 2007; Kawakami, Steele, Cifa, 
Phills, & Dovidio, 2008) indicates that approach training, which involves pulling a 
joystick toward oneself when presented with certain stimuli (e.g., pictures of minority 
members, math-related concepts), can improve implicit racial attitudes or women’s 
attitudes toward math. Phills, Kawakami, Tabi, Nadolny, and Inzlicht (2011) further 
found that the approach training with Black faces as stimuli had led to enhanced self-
Blacks associations for the participants.  
Propositions that are considered as true also create pressures on the associative network 
for the formation of correspondent associations between the concepts included in the 
propositions. An example is given by Greenwald et al. (2002), in which a person’s cousin 
was married to a former criminal. In this case, the proposition about the marriage creates 
pressures, forcing a new association between the person’s cousin and the former criminal 
to which the cousin is married.  
1.2.3 From ownership propositions to self-object associations 
Drawing on the previous analysis, it can be argued that ownership propositions inferred 
from ownership scenarios (e.g., “I own this object”) create pressures on the owner’s 
associative network to form an association between the owner’s self and the owned 
object. More importantly, it is further argued that the pressures from ownership 
propositions do not necessarily lead to the formation of the associations. The actual 
formation of self-object associations is the function of the associative network by 
following two principles on the basis of the relations between the owner’s representation 
of self and that of the owned object. This notion will be elaborated in the following.  
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The relation between a representation of the self and that of an object can be defined as 
varying along a continuum from self-object congruence to self-object incongruence3. 
Self-object congruence embodies the extent to which the two representations are similar. 
If representations are defined as active sets of nodes, then the degree of congruence 
between the representation of the self and that of an object will be contingent to the 
amount of shared nodes between the two representations. The more nodes shared 
between the two representations, the higher the level of self-object congruence. Figure 
1.2 depicts an associative structure with self-object congruence, as the two nodes: “me” 
and “lion” share a common node of “strong”.  
 
Figure 1.2. An associative structure with self-object congruence, which facilitates 
the formation of an association between the node representing the self (“Me”) and 
the node representing the concept of the object (“Lion”) 
Self-object incongruence, in contrast, embodies the extent to which the two 
representations are different or, in the language of the unified theory (Greenwald et al., 
2002), bipolar-opposing. If, again, representations are defined as active sets of nodes, 
then the degree of incongruence between the representation of the self and that of an 
object will be contingent to the degree to which the nodes of each representation are 
                                                 
3
 Self-object congruence and incongruence are the ends of a continuum. The middle point of the continuum 
should be self-object irrelevance.  
 
 
 
 
Me 
Lion 
Strong 
+ 
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associated to each side of a pair of bipolar-opposing nodes. For example, if the 
representation of the self includes the node of positivity and the representation of an 
object includes the node of negativity, then this specific associative structure can be 
described as indicating self-object incongruence. Figure 1.3 depicts such an associative 
structure with self-object incongruence.  
Drawing on Wheeler, DeMarree, and Petty’s (2007) active-self model, the distinction 
between the active representation of a concept (e.g., the self) and the chronic 
representation of the concept is made in the current model. The chronic representation of 
the self, for example, includes all nodes associated with the node of self (see Figure 1.1, 
for example). An active representation of the self, accordingly, is a subset of chronic 
representation of the self that is currently accessible and may only include a few nodes 
that are currently accessible (e.g., athletic). The same example can be made for an active 
representation of an object, which is a subset of the chronic representation of the object. 
In the current model, the levels of self-object congruence or incongruence are determined 
by active, not chronic, representations of the self and of the object.  
 
Figure 1.3. An associative structure with self-object incongruence, which inhibits the 
formation of an association between the node representing the self (“Me”) and the 
node representing the concept of the object (“Snake”) 
Now that the antecedents of self-object association formation have been defined, it’s 
necessary to specify the processes of self-object association formation. It is assumed that 
self-object association formation follows two operational principles of the associative 
network (Greenwald et al., 2002), which translates self-object congruence and 
incongruence into effects on self-object association formation.  
  
Me Snake 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
× 
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The first principle of balance-congruity states that the associative structure in which two 
unassociated concepts are both associated with the same node should facilitate the 
formation of a new association between the two concepts. From this principle and the 
previous definition of self-object congruence, it can be deducted that self-object 
congruence will lead to a facilitation effect on the formation of self-object association, as 
depicted by the “+” sign in Figure 1.2. For an example, if a person who views him or 
herself as intelligent is given a gift that has a connotation of intelligence, such as a Rubic 
cube, then the self-object congruence caused by the shared concept of intelligence 
between the person’s representation of the self and that of the Rubic cube should 
facilitate the formation of a self-object association between the person and the Rubic 
cube.  
The second principle of imbalance-dissonance4 states that, the associative network resists 
forming a new association that would result in a node being associated to two bipolar-
opposite nodes. From this principle and the definition of self-object incongruence, it can 
be deducted that self-object incongruence will lead to an inhibition effect on the 
formation of self-object association, as depicted by the “×” sign in Figure 1.3. For an 
example, if a person who views him or herself as unathletic is given a gift that has the 
connotation of athleticism, such as a set of dumb bells, then the self-object incongruence 
caused by the association between the self and unathletic and the association between the 
gift and athletic should inhibit the formation of self-object association between the person 
and the dumb bells.  
                                                 
4
 The term “dissonance” here carries different meanings from that in classic cognitive dissonance theory. 
Although not specified in Greenwald et al. (2002), it can be speculated that it refers to the resistance force 
of the associative network against “imbalanced” associative structures. In the classic cognitive dissonance 
model, the term dissonance refers to the aversive feeling aroused by the inconsistency between cognitive 
components, which drives for a change in these cognitive components to restore balance and reduce the 
aversive feeling. Therefore, the current “dissonance” and cognitive dissonance are similar in that both lead 
to driving forces that restore balance either to the associative network or to the belief system, respectively.  
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1.2.4 Summary  
The current model involves two steps. In the first step, people’s perceptions of ownership 
lead to ownership propositions, which put pressure on people’s associative networks to 
form self-object associations. In the second step, the formation of associations is further 
facilitated or inhibited, depending on the levels of congruence or incongruence, 
respectively, between the active representation of the self and that of the object.  
According to the current model, to predict the effect of ownership on self-object 
associations, it is necessary to understand the levels of self-object congruence and 
incongruence in ownership scenarios. First, pre-existing levels of self-object congruence 
and incongruence can be determined, if both the chronic representation of the self and 
those of the objects contain certain highly accessible features that can be automatically 
activated. Attitudes, or feelings of pleasantness or unpleasantness towards certain stimuli, 
are highly accessible and can be automatically activated (Bargh, Chaiken, Raymond, & 
Hymes, 1996; Fazio, Sanbonmatsu, Powell, & Kardes, 1986). Drawing on (a) individuals 
tend to have an automatic positive feeling towards the self (Greenwald et al., 2002), and 
(b) objects of positive or negative valence can automatically activate pleasant or 
unpleasant feelings, respectively, it is assumed that positive objects have pre-existing 
levels of evaluative self-object congruence, while negative objects have certain pre-
existing levels of evaluative self-object incongruence.  
Secondly, according to Wheeler et al. (2007), both the active representation of the self 
and that of the object can change, either by changing the active subset of chronic 
representations of the self and the object or by introducing new materials into the active 
representations of the self and the object. As will be elaborated in the next section, it is 
assumed that information processing during the choice between multiple objects can lead 
to changes in active representations in a way that increases the level of self-object 
congruence for the chosen object, and therefore facilitate the formation of a self-object 
association for the chosen object. Importantly, this assumed process should occur 
regardless of the pre-existing levels of self-object congruence of the chosen object.  
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1.3 Ownership scenarios 
Two types of ownership scenarios: mere-ownership and ownership-by-choice, are 
selected to test the above assumptions. The key difference between the two scenarios is 
the level of information processing involved in each scenario. In a mere-ownership 
scenario (Beggan, 1992), a person is offered a gift that is randomly selected from several 
alternatives without the freedom to choose. Due to the lack of choice and control over the 
outcome of choice, all other factors being equal, prospective owners in the mere-
ownership scenario should have a minimal level of motivation to process the alternative 
objects. Therefore, the mere-ownership scenario should involve a minimal level of 
cognitive processing of the alternative objects.  
In an ownership-by-choice scenario, in contrast, a person is free to choose a gift from the 
alternatives. With the introduction of choice, this scenario involves an elevated sense of 
personal control and enhanced levels of motivation to process the alternatives (Tafarodi, 
Mehranvar, Panton, & Milne, 2002; Chan, Karbowski, Monty, & Perlmuter, 1986). 
Therefore, a relatively high level of cognitive processing of the alternative objects should 
happen in the ownership-by-choice scenario. Previous research (for a review, see 
Brownstein, 2003) has documented two common types of choice-related information 
processing: pre-choice processing and post-choice processing. The features of each type 
of processing and their potential effects on the active representations of the alternative 
objects will be elaborated in the remainder of this section.  
1.3.1 Pre-choice processing 
During pre-choice processing—information processing that occurs before the choice 
maker makes the decision—individuals evaluate and differentiate between choice 
alternatives in order to develop preferences (Brownstein, 2003; Busemeyer & Johnson, 
2004; Svenson, 1992; Thurstone, 1927). According to Tversky’s (1972) elimination-by-
aspect model, pre-choice processing involves the examination and evaluation of choice 
alternatives along a set of aspects that the choice makers consider as important. Each 
time, one aspect is selected and the alternatives that do not include the positive feature on 
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the selected aspect are eliminated. This process repeats with a new aspect, and goes on 
until there is a favorite alternative remaining.  
Applying this process to the current model, it can be postulated that pre-choice 
processing leads to changes in the active representations of the choice alternatives, so that 
the representation of the preferred alternative contains more overlapping features with the 
self than the representations of the rejected alternatives. Consequently, the preferred 
alternative should have a higher level of self-object congruence than the rejected 
alternatives. For example, imagine a person looking to buy a car faces the choice between 
a Toyota and a Mazda. In order to make the choice, the person first needs to contemplate 
on his or her own preferences. If the person determines that he or she values the feature 
of “fun to drive”, he or she will need to process information about the cars to determine 
which one has an advantage in this feature. If the Mazda wins in this regard, its advantage 
in “fun to drive” over the Toyota will lead to a higher level of self-object congruence (for 
this person) in the Mazda than that in the Toyota.  
1.3.2 Post-choice processing 
Post-choice processing involves post-choice re-evaluations of the alternative objects or 
selective exposure to choice-confirming information that are motivated by the need to 
justify the choice and reduce post-choice dissonance (Brehm, 1956; Festinger, 1957, 
1964). Festinger suggested that after a choice, people tend to experience the aversive 
feeling of post-choice dissonance, due to the cognitive inconsistency between three 
cognitive elements: (a) the positive features of the rejected alternatives, (b) the negative 
features of the chosen alternative, and (c) the commitment to the chosen alternative. In 
order to reduce dissonance, people may further bolster their preferences of the chosen 
alternative over the rejected alternatives (for a review, see Chen & Risen, 2010), or they 
can selectively process information that confirms their choices (e.g., information about 
the positive features of the chosen object and negative features of the rejected object). 
Specifically, they may avoid information that conflicts with their choices (e.g., 
information about the negative features of the chosen object and positive features of the 
rejected object, for a review, Jonas, Schulz-Hardt, Frey, & Thelen, 2001).  
13 
 
It is unclear, however, how post-choice processing influences self-object associations. 
Drawing on Gawronski and Strack’s (2004) finding that cognitive dissonance influences 
explicit but not automatic evaluations, it is possible that motivated re-evaluations of the 
alternative objects reduce dissonance without changing their underlying representations, 
which should subsequently lead to no effect on self-object associations. Selective 
exposure to choice-confirming information, on the other hand, may change the 
representations of the alternative objects by activating additional features in the chosen 
object over and above the ones that have already been activated during pre-choice 
processing. For example, if the person who has chosen the Mazda is exposed to 
additional information about the Mazda after the choice, he or she may find additional 
positive features of the car (e.g., fun to drive), which would further enhance the already 
formed self-object association between the person and the Mazda. When additional 
information is unavailable, however, it is unclear whether or not individuals engage in 
active search for additional positive features within the existing representations of the 
chosen alternative.  
In sum, it is assumed that in the ownership-by-choice scenario, choice should facilitate 
the formation of self-object association for the owned object by changing the 
representation of the chosen object and enhancing its level of self-object congruence.  
1.4 Predictions and overview of studies 
Drawing on the previous analyses, predictions about boundary conditions for the 
formation of self-object associations in each ownership scenario can be made. First, it is 
predicted that in the mere-ownership scenario where information processing is minimal, 
the formation of self-object associations should be determined by pre-existing levels of 
congruence and incongruence between the representation of the self and that of the 
owned object. Using object valence as a proxy of self-object congruence and 
incongruence along the valence dimension, it is predicted that the formation of self-object 
associations in the mere-ownership scenario, indicated by an ownership effect on self-
object associations, should be facilitated when the alternatives are positive objects and 
inhibited when the alternatives are negative objects.  
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Second, the moderating effects of self-object congruence/incongruence in the mere-
ownership scenario should not apply to the ownership-by-choice scenario. Instead, for 
objects with pre-existing levels of incongruence with the owner’s self, information 
processing during choice can change their representations and increase the levels of self-
object congruence. Therefore, it is predicted that the chosen object should have a higher 
level of self-object congruence than the rejected objects regardless of their levels of self-
object congruence prior to the choice.  
For example, if a person is provided a choice between the picture of a snake and that of a 
spider, both of which the person dislikes and therefore incongruent with the person’s self. 
After processing the two objects, the person decides to choose snake as he finds a feature 
that he likes about snakes, that they are fast. The feature of “fast” becomes included in 
the active representation of snakes, and creates a certain level of self-object congruence 
for snakes which may further facilitate the formation of self-object association for snakes. 
This process is illustrated in Figure 1.4.  
 
Figure 1.4. The activation of self-object congruence (mediated by the feature of 
“Fast”) in the representation of an object (“Snake”) otherwise incongruent with the 
self. The self-object congruence facilitates the formation of a self-object association.  
Accordingly, it is predicted that for negative objects, the formation of self-object 
associations in ownership scenarios should be moderated by choice. In the mere-
ownership scenario, there should be no ownership effect on self-object associations for 
negative objects. In the ownership-by-choice scenario where owners have a choice, 
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however, there should be an ownership effect on self-object associations for negative 
objects.  
To empirically test the two predictions, five experimental studies are reported in Chapter 
2. All experiments involve scenarios in which participants had real ownership of a novel 
object. Study 1 was designed to test the predicted moderating effects of object valence in 
the mere-ownership scenario. Study 2 tested the predicted moderating effect of choice on 
self-object associations for negative objects. Study 3 was designed to address an issue 
with the free-choice paradigm and to rule out the possibility that the formation of self-
object associations is due to pre-existing differences between choice alternatives in the 
levels of self-object congruence. Study 4 and Study 5 were designed to test the effects of 
various factors pertaining to the degrees of pre-and post-choice processing on self-object 
associations.  
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2 Empirical Studies 
For readers’ convenience, several key terms are used throughout the next chapters to 
describe certain patterns of results. First, an ownership effect is defined as the advantage 
of an owned object over an otherwise equivalent non-owned object in the variable of 
interest (e.g., self-object associations, explicit evaluations). Thereby, an ownership effect 
on self-object associations represents the advantage of an owned object over a non-owned 
object in the strength of their associations with the self of the owners. The ownership 
effects found in the mere-ownership scenario are further labeled as mere-ownership 
effects, while the ownership effects found in the ownership-by-choice scenario are 
labeled as ownership-by-choice effects.  
2.1 Study 1: Object valence and mere-ownership 
The main goal of Study 1 was to test the first prediction outlined in Chapter 1 (p. 13): In 
the mere-ownership scenario, self-object association formation should be moderated by 
pre-existing levels of self-object congruence or incongruence. To test this hypothesis, 
object valence—the valence of the two alternative objects—was manipulated as either 
positive or negative. A positive object is assumed to be congruent with the self, because 
their representations share a common node of positivity; a negative object, in contrast, is 
assumed to be incongruent with the self, because the object’s representation contains a 
link to the node representing negativity, which is bipolar-opposite to the node 
representing positivity that is part of the representation of the self. According to the 
theoretical framework outlined in Chapter 1, the formation of self-object association 
should be facilitated by self-object congruence and inhibited by self-object incongruence. 
Assuming that in the mere-ownership scenario the levels of self-object congruence and 
incongruence remain unchanged, it was predicted that a mere-ownership effect on self-
object associations should be found when the alternative objects are of positive valence, 
but not when the alternative objects are of negative valence.  
In accordance with the current conceptualization of self-object associations, the studies 
used an indirect measure of self-object associations based on the sequential priming 
paradigm (Fazio, Jackson, Dunton, & Williams, 1995; Gawronski et al., 2007), which is 
17 
 
commonly assumed to measure the strength of mental associations. Moreover, in this 
study, automatic evaluations of the objects were assessed with a similar measure based on 
the notion of affective priming. Assuming that (a) self-object associations allow for the 
automatic transfer of valence from the owner’s self to the owned object, and (b) the 
transfer of valence leads to an improved positive automatic evaluation towards the owned 
object, it was predicted that the mere-ownership effects on automatic evaluations should 
also be moderated by object valence.  
2.1.1 Method 
2.1.1.1 Participants and design 
A total of 156 undergraduate students (124 women and 32 men; mean age 19.03 years) 
from the subject pool of the University of Western Ontario participated for research 
credit. One participant’s data were incomplete due to a computer malfunction.  
The study used a 2 (Object Valence: positive vs. negative, between-Ss) × 2 (Object 
Status: owned vs. non-owned, within-Ss) × 2 (Order of Measures: self-object associations 
measure first vs. automatic evaluations measure first, between-Ss) mixed-model design. 
The two dependent variables were self-object associations and automatic object 
evaluations. 
2.1.1.2 The objects 
The objects used in the current research were adapted from the International Affective 
Picture System (IAPS, Lang, Bradley, & Cuthbert, 2008), which provides a pool of 
pictures that vary widely in terms of content and the range of established empirical 
pleasantness ratings. The standard ratings of pleasantness were provided by 
approximately 100 college students (half women) taking an introductory psychology 
course, a sample that is highly comparable to the samples in the present research. The 
ratings were made on a scale from 1 (very unpleasant) to 9 (very pleasant). To keep the 
cover story plausible, pictures with moderately unpleasant ratings were selected for the 
negative objects conditions. As depicted in Figure 2.1, the two pictures selected for the 
positive objects condition were a picture of a lion (No. 1720, M
 
= 6.79) and a picture of 
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two tigers (No. 1721, M = 7.30); the two pictures selected for the negative objects 
condition were two snake pictures, here and after called Snake A (No. 1050, M = 3.46) 
and Snake B (No. 1033, M = 3.87). Pictures in the same condition have (a) similar 
content, (b) similar levels of pleasantness ratings, and (c) different visual features (e.g., 
color, contour) so that they can be distinguished easily by the participants. 
 
Figure 2.1. The positive and negative objects used in the current research.  
2.1.1.3 Mere-ownership task 
Participants were told that they would receive a color print of a picture from the "Nature 
and Wild Life" collection as a special gratitude for their participation. They were told that 
two pictures would be randomly selected from a pool of many pictures and then a 
computer program would randomly select a picture for them. The two positive or 
negative objects, depending on the condition, were then presented side by side on the 
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computer screen. Participants were asked to press the space bar to start the random 
selection. Then, as a visualization of the random selection process, a yellow frame 
appeared around one of the two pictures and started to “jump” from one to the other 
quickly several times before slowing down and settling on one of the pictures. 
Participants were then told that the picture in the yellow frame was the one that was 
selected for them. After 6 seconds of display, the pictures disappeared and participants 
were told to find the experimenter.  
Upon request, the experimenter returned to the testing room and asked the participants 
which picture was selected. The experimenter made notes of the participants’ responses 
and told the participants that a print of the chosen picture was reserved for them for pick-
up after the study. The experimenter then pressed a key on the keyboard to return to the 
previous screen. Unknown to the participants, the experimenter checked whether the 
participants’ responses were consistent with the actual outcomes of the random selection 
displayed on the screen. The responses of all participants matched the actual outcomes of 
random selection.  
Although the program’s choice appeared to be random (due to the animation of the 
yellow frame), the outcome of the choice for each participant was indeed predetermined 
according to the condition to which the participant was assigned. The number of 
participants receiving each specific picture was kept equal across conditions.  
2.1.1.4 Measures 
Participants were asked to complete two priming tasks: a sequential priming task as the 
measure of self-object associations (Gawronski et al., 2007) and an affective priming task 
as the measure of automatic evaluations (Fazio et al., 1995; Gawronski et al., 2007). The 
order of the two measures was counter-balanced between participants.  
On each trial of the sequential priming task, participants were presented with a blank 
screen for 500ms, a fixation cross for 200ms, a supraliminal presentation of a prime 
picture for 200ms, and a target word that remained on the screen until a response was 
made (SOA = 200ms). They were asked to press a key, A or Numpad 5, to categorize 
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each target word as either related to “self” or related to “other” as quickly as possible. 
The target words related to “self” were self, me, I, mine, and my, whereas the target words 
related to “other” were other, them, their, they, and it. The prime pictures were the two 
positive or negative objects which participants encountered during the mere-ownership 
task and an additional neutral grey square which was included as a baseline prime. The 
pictures were presented in the resolution of approximately 430 × 300 pixels. Each picture 
was presented four times with each of the ten target words, summing up to a total of 120 
trials. 
The affective priming task used the same procedural parameters as the sequential priming 
task, except that participants were asked to categorize each target word, selected from a 
different set of 40 target words, as either “positive” or “negative” as quickly as possible. 
The 20 positive target words were paradise, summer, harmony, freedom, honesty, honor, 
smile, cheer, pleasure, heaven, friend, sunrise, love, relaxation, peace, holiday, rainbow, 
luck, miracle, and diamond, whereas the 20negative target words were evil, sickness, 
vomit, bomb, murder, abuse, prison, crash, assault, cancer, pain, accident, grief, tragedy, 
poverty, pollution, virus, disaster, hatred, and terror. Each of the three prime pictures 
was presented once with each target word, summing up to a total of 120 trials. Response 
latencies and errors were recorded during both tasks. 
Following the logic of the priming paradigm (Fazio et al. 1995), higher levels of self-
object associations for an object are indicated by shorter response latencies on trials with 
prime-target combinations involving the object and self-related target words and longer 
response latencies on trials with prime target combinations involving the object and 
other-related target words. Similarly, more positive automatic evaluations are indicated 
by shorter response latencies on trials with prime-target combinations involving the 
object and positive target words and longer response latencies on trials with prime-target 
combinations involving the object and negative target words.  
2.1.1.5 Procedure 
Participants were seated in 5 separate computer cells in a large room. After signing 
informed consent forms, they were randomly assigned to one of the four conditions 
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defined by Object Valence (positive vs. negative) and Order of Measures (self-object 
associations first vs. automatic evaluation first). They were asked to complete the mere-
ownership task and the measures of self-object associations and automatic evaluation in 
counter-balanced order. At the end of the study, all participants were fully debriefed and 
received a 4-inch × 6-inch print of the selected picture.  
2.1.2 Results 
2.1.2.1 Self-object associations 
Response latency data from the sequential priming task were processed following the 
procedure by Gawronski et al. (2007): latencies from incorrect responses (5.1%) were 
eliminated, then outlier latencies higher than 1500ms (2.9% of the correct responses) 
were truncated. The processed response latencies were then averaged for each participant 
according to the 6 prime-target combinations, involving the 3 types of prime stimuli 
(owned object, non-owned object, gray square) and 2 target types (self-related words, 
other-related words). Four baseline-corrected priming scores were calculated by 
subtracting the mean latencies of each of the four prime-target combinations involving a 
given object and a particular kind of target stimulus (i.e., owned-object/self-related, 
owned-object/other-related, non-owned object/self-related, non-owned object/other-
related) from the mean latencies on the corresponding baseline trials (gray square/self-
related, gray square/other-related).5 Preliminary analyses indicated no object-specific 
effects: The results reported in the following were not affected by the specific object that 
participants received during the study.  
The four baseline-corrected priming scores were submitted to a 2 (Prime: owned vs. non-
owned picture, within-Ss) × 2 (Target: words related to self vs. words related to other, 
within-Ss) × 2 (Objects Valence: positive vs. negative, between-Ss) × 2 (Order of 
Measurement: affective priming first vs. sequential priming first, between-Ss) mixed-
                                                 
5
 The same analyses on log-transformed response latencies produced similar results for both self-object 
associations and automatic evaluations. Results of the analyses using original response latencies were 
reported to keep it consistent between the reported means and the actual analyses.  
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model ANOVA. The analysis revealed a marginally significant three-way interaction 
between Prime, Target, and Object Valence, F(1, 151) = 3.48, p = .064, ηp2 = .023. No 
other main or interaction effects were found to be significant, all ps > .05. The means and 
standard deviations for the 3-way interaction are shown in Table 2.1.  
Table 2.1. Mean baseline corrected response latencies from the self-other priming 
task in Study 1  
 
Target 
 
Prime 
Positive Pictures Negative Pictures 
Owned Non-owned Owned Non-owned 
Self-related -5.64(49.09) -13.07(49.16) -16.66(49.11) -16.05(49.18) 
Other-related -18.82(54.83) -3.17(56.56) -19.23(54.85) -20.21(56.59) 
N = 155. Numbers in parentheses are standard deviations.  
The three-way interaction suggests that the size of sequential priming effects was 
different between the two object valence conditions. In order to specify this difference, 
two indices of self-object associations, one for the owned object and one for the non-
owned object, were calculated from the four baseline-corrected priming scores by 
subtracting the baseline-corrected priming scores for self-related target words from the 
baseline-corrected priming scores for other-related target words for each of the two 
objects (i.e., owned vs. non-owned). Higher values on each index indicate higher levels 
of self-object associations for the relevant object. 
These two indices were submitted to a 2 (Object Status: owned vs. non-owned, within-
Ss) × 2 (Objects Valence: positive vs. negative, between-Ss) × 2 (Order of Measurement: 
affective priming first vs. sequential priming first, between-Ss) mixed ANOVA analysis, 
which generated a significant 2-way interaction between Object Status and Object 
Valence that was statistically the same as the 3-way interaction between Prime, Target, 
and Object Valence in the previous ANOVA analysis. Tests of simple effects of Object 
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Status (owned vs. non-owned, within Ss) at different levels of Objects Valence (positive 
vs. negative, between Ss) further indicate that in the positive objects condition, self-
object associations were significantly stronger for the owned object (M = 13.18) than for 
the non-owned object (M = -9.89), F(1,151) = 6.06, p = .015, ηp2 = .039. In the negative 
objects condition, however, self-object associations did not significantly differ for the 
owned object (M = 2.57) and the non-owned object (M = 4.16), F(1,151) = 0.029, p = .86, 
ηp
2
 < .001. The results are depicted in Figure 2.2. 
 
Figure 2.2. Self-object associations as a function of mere-ownership and object 
valence in Study 1. Error bars represent standard errors.  
2.1.2.2 Automatic Evaluations 
The response latency data from the affective priming task were processed in the same 
way the sequential priming task data were processed. Latencies from incorrect responses 
(3.2%) were eliminated and outlier latencies higher than 1500ms (2.6% of the correct 
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responses) were truncated. Response latencies were averaged for each participant 
according to 6 prime-target combinations, involving the 3 types of primes (owned object, 
non-owned object, gray square) and the 2 types of targets (positive, negative). Four 
baseline-corrected priming scores were calculated by subtracting the mean latencies of 
each of the four prime-target combinations involving a given object and a particular kind 
of target stimulus (i.e., owned-object/positive, owned-object/negative, non-owned 
object/positive, non-owned object/negative) from the mean latencies on the 
corresponding baseline trials (gray square/positive, gray square/negative).  
The four baseline-corrected priming scores were submitted to a 2 (Prime: owned vs. non-
owned picture, within-Ss) × 2 (Target: positive words vs. negative words, within-Ss) × 2 
(Objects Valence: positive vs. negative, between-Ss) × 2 (Order of Measurement: 
affective priming first vs. sequential priming first, between-Ss) mixed-model ANOVA. 
The analysis revealed a significant three-way interaction between Prime, Target, and 
Object Valence, F(1, 151) = 5.49, p = .020, ηp2 = .035. No other effects were significant, 
all ps > .05. The means and standard deviations for the three-way interaction are shown 
in Table 2.2. 
Table 2.2. Mean baseline corrected response latencies from the affective priming 
task in Study 1 
 
Target 
 
Prime 
Positive Pictures Negative Pictures 
Owned Non-owned Owned Non-owned 
Positive -2.08(63.87) -15.29(62.98) -13.44(63.90) -9.24(63.01) 
Negative -10.49(54.31) -5.07(49.55) -5.44(54.34) -13.04(49.58) 
N = 155. Numbers in parentheses are standard deviations. 
The three-way interaction again indicates that the size of affective priming effects 
differed between the two Object Valence conditions. In order to specify this difference, 
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two positivity indices, one for owned object and one for non-owned object, were 
calculated from the four baseline-corrected priming scores by subtracting the baseline-
corrected priming scores for positive target words from the baseline-corrected priming 
scores for negative target words for each of the two objects (i.e., owned vs. non-owned). 
Higher values on each index indicate higher levels of positivity in the automatic 
evaluation of the relevant object.  
 
Figure 2.3. Automatic evaluations of objects as a function of mere-ownership and 
object valence in Study 1. Error bars represent standard errors.  
These two indices were submitted to a 2 (Object Status: owned vs. non-owned, within-
Ss) × 2 (Objects Valence: positive vs. negative, between-Ss) × 2 (Order of Measurement: 
affective priming first vs. sequential priming first, between-Ss) mixed ANOVA analysis, 
which again generated a significant 2-way interaction between Object Status and Object 
Valence that was statistically the same as the 3-way interaction between Prime, Target, 
and Object Valence in the previous ANOVA analysis. Tests of simple effects of Object 
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Status (owned vs. non-owned, within Ss) at different levels of Objects Valence (positive 
vs. negative, between Ss) indicate that, in the positive objects condition, automatic 
evaluations were significantly more positive for the owned object (M = 8.41) than the 
non-owned object (M = -10.22), F(1,151) = 4.09, p = .045, ηp2 = .026. In the negative 
objects condition, however, automatic evaluations did not significantly differ for the 
owned object (M = -8.00) and non-owned object (M = 3.80), F(1,151) = 1.66, p = .20, ηp2 
= .011. The results are depicted in Figure 2.3. 
2.1.3 Discussion 
Study 1 was designed to test the moderating effects of pre-existing levels of self-object 
congruence and incongruence on the formation of self-object associations in the mere-
ownership scenario. Consistent with the prediction of the present research, the results 
indicate that the mere-ownership effects on self-object associations and automatic 
evaluations were moderated by object valence. Specifically, in a mere-ownership 
scenario, participants indicated stronger self-object associations for the owned object 
compared to that for the non-owned object only when the alternative objects are of 
positive valence and not when they are of negative valence. These results are consistent 
with the predicted moderating roles of pre-existing levels of self-object congruence and 
incongruence in the formation of self-object associations in the mere-ownership scenario. 
The results on automatic evaluations indicate an ownership effect on automatic 
evaluation in the positive-objects condition but not in the negative-objects condition. The 
similarity between the pattern of findings on self-object associations and that on 
automatic evaluations is consistent with the postulated mechanism of valence 
transference from the self to the owned object. Taken together, the findings from Study 1 
are consistent with the prediction of the present research.  
2.2 Study 2: Mere-ownership vs. choice 
The findings of Study 1 suggest that pre-existing self-object congruence/incongruence 
facilitates/inhibits the formation of self-object associations in the mere-ownership 
scenario. In the ownership-by-choice scenario, however, this should not be the case. As 
specified in the second prediction outlined in Chapter 1 (p. 14), when individuals can 
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choose between alternative objects, information processing of the objects during choice 
making should change the representations of the objects in a way that increases the 
degree of self-object congruence for the more preferred object relative to the less 
preferred object. The choice-induced self-object congruence should then facilitate the 
formation of self-object association for the chosen object—assuming that individuals tend 
to choose the more preferred object over the less preferred one—regardless of the pre-
existing level of self-object congruence for the objects. Therefore, even for the negative 
objects (e.g. snake pictures) that are evaluatively incongruent with the self, formation of 
self-object association can still be possible when individuals choose between two 
negative objects. Thus, for negative objects, an ownership effect on self-object 
associations should be found in the ownership-by-choice scenario, but not in the mere-
ownership scenario (as indicated by the findings of Study 1). The main goal of Study 2 
was to test this prediction.  
The study focused on negative objects only, with positive objects being excluded from 
the experimental design. This decision was due to several reasons. First, according to the 
current theorizing, the ownership effect on self-object association was predicted to be 
found for negative objects only in the ownership-by-choice scenario and not in the mere-
ownership scenario. In contrast, for positive objects, the ownership effect was predicted 
to be present in both scenarios, possibly at a higher level in the ownership-by-choice 
scenario than in the mere-ownership scenario. Therefore, negative objects provide a 
better means than positive objects to test the presumed difference between the two 
scenarios: a higher level of information processing that changes object representations in 
the ownership-by-choice scenario than in the mere-ownership scenario. Second, the 
question of whether formation of self-object association is possible for negative objects is, 
by itself, intuitively interesting, especially considering that most of previous studies on 
ownership and choice (e.g., Beggan, 1992; Gawronski et al., 2007; Huang et al., 2009) 
have involved objects with positive or neutral valence (e.g., consumer products, good-
looking postcards, or pencils) but never objects with negative valence. The third reason is 
a practical one: The manipulation of object valence would require doubled sample sizes. 
For the same practical reason, the following studies (Studies 3, 4, and 5) also focused on 
negative objects with positive objects excluded.  
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The study included a measure of self-object associations that is different from the one 
employed in Study 1. The main reason for the change of measure was the relatively small 
effect sizes (and thus, low statistical power) of the findings in Study 1, which might be 
due to the low reliability of sequential priming measures (see Gawronski & De Houwer, 
2014). In the current and the following studies, a measure based on the implicit 
association test (IAT, Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998) was used. The IAT 
typically shows high estimates of reliability (Gawronski & De Houwer, 2014) and high 
levels of construct validity for measuring mental associations related to the self (e.g., 
Greenwald & Farnham, 2000). One limitation of the IAT, however, is that it assesses 
relative associations of two target concepts (e.g., the owned object and the non-owned 
object) with two attributes (e.g., strength of associations with ‘self’ and that with ‘other’, 
Greenwald et al., 1998). In the context of the present research, this limitation implies that 
self-object associations measured by the IAT reflect the relative strength of self-object 
associations for one object over the other, rather than absolute associations for each 
object.  
The automatic evaluation measure was excluded from the study (and the following 
studies) due to potential interference from the performance in the first IAT task on the 
performance in the second IAT task, if two IAT tasks are completed consecutively within 
the same experimental session (Nosek, Greenwald, & Banaji, 2005). Moreover, 
practically, the inclusion of an automatic evaluation measure would require counter-
balancing the order of the self-object association measure and the automatic evaluation 
measure between participants, requiring doubled sample sizes. For these reasons, it was 
decided that this study, along with the following studies, would mainly focus on self-
object associations—the key construct of the current research.  
2.2.1 Method 
2.2.1.1 Participants and Design 
A total of 100 participants (65 women and 35 men; mean age 23.1 years) were recruited 
through posters on campus, as well as using the summer subject pool mailing lists of the 
Department of Psychology, University of Western Ontario. Participants received $10 as 
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compensation for their participation in a 3-component study that lasted approximately 
one hour. One participant’s data were lost due to a computer malfunction.  
The study included a single between-subjects factor (Ownership Scenario: mere-
ownership vs. choice). The dependent variable was an IAT index reflecting relative self-
object associations for owned versus non-owned objects. The scoring method for this 
index will be introduced in the results section.  
2.2.1.2 Ownership task 
Following the procedure in Study 1, participants were told that they would receive a 
picture as a special token of appreciation, and that for this purpose, two alternative 
pictures would be randomly selected from a large collection. In the mere-ownership 
condition, participants were told that the picture they were about to receive would be 
randomly selected from the two alternative pictures by the computer. In the choice 
condition, participants were told that they would be allowed to freely choose the picture 
that they personally prefer from the two alternative pictures. The two snake pictures used 
in Study 1 were then presented on the screen. In the mere-ownership condition, 
participants were told to press the space bar to start the same “random selection” process 
as in Study 1. In the choice condition, participants were told to take a careful look at the 
two pictures and think about which one they prefer. After 20 seconds of display, they 
were asked to press the Numpad 1 key to choose the picture on the left side of the screen 
and Numpad 2 to choose the picture one the right side. The position (left and right) of two 
pictures was counter-balanced between participants, such that for half of the participants 
Snake A appeared on the left side and Snake B appeared on the right side, whereas for the 
other half Snake A appeared on the right and Snake B appeared on the left. The picture 
that they chose was subsequently framed in yellow. After the owned picture was 
determined, all participants were asked to contact the experimenter. The experimenter 
then returned to the testing room, asked the participants which picture they chose, made a 
note on their choice, and told the participants that a copy of the selected picture was 
reserved for pick-up after the study.  
30 
 
2.2.1.3 IAT-based measure of self-object associations 
In a “quick categorization task”, participants were asked to categorize target pictures or 
words according to the category labels displayed on the top-left and top-right corners of 
the screen by pressing a left-handed key (A) or a right-handed key (Numpad 5) as quickly 
as possible without making too many errors. Response latencies and errors were 
recorded.  
The task comprised 5 blocks that differed in terms of the target stimuli (words, pictures, 
or both) and response categories. According to the standard  IAT paradigm (Greenwald et 
al., 1998), Block 1 consisted of 20 trials of the initial target-concept discrimination task. 
The two snake pictures from the ownership task were used as both category labels (with 
the picture of Snake A as the top-left category and the picture of Snake B as the top-right 
category) and target pictures. Block 2 consisted of 20 trials of the attribute discrimination 
task (Greenwald et al., 1998), with “self” as the top-left category and “other” as the top-
right category. Five words related to self (i.e., self, me, I, mine, my) and 5 words related 
to other (i.e., other, them, their, they, it) were used as target stimuli. Block 3 consisted of 
60 trials of the first combined task, with “self or Snake A (the picture)” as the top-left 
category and “other or Snake B (the picture)” as the top-right category. The target stimuli 
were the 2 snake pictures (presented 15 times each) and the 10 self-related and other-
related words (presented 3 times each). Block 4 consisted of 20 trials of the reversed 
target-concept discrimination task, with Snake B as the top-left category and Snake A as 
the top-right category. Block 5 consisted of 60 trials of the reversed (or second) 
combined task, with “self or Snake B” as the top-left category and “other or snake A” as 
the top-right category. The target stimuli were same pictures and words as in Block 3. 
Whenever a false response was made, the word “Error” was displayed on the screen for 
1000ms before participants could move on to the next trial. The order and settings of 
Block 3 and Block 5, the two blocks with the combined task, were fixed for all 
participants. The significance of this setting for the interpretation of the findings will be 
discussed in the results section.  
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2.2.1.4 Procedure 
The study was run as the last component of a three-component battery. Participants were 
seated in 5 separate computer cells in a large room. After signing informed consent 
forms, they were randomly assigned to one of the two conditions of Ownership Procedure 
(choice vs. mere-ownership) and completed the corresponding ownership task, the IAT 
measure, and a demographic questionnaire. All participants were fully debriefed about 
the purpose of this study and receive a 4-inch by 6-inch print-out of the selected picture 
along with the $10 compensation for participating in all 3 components.  
2.2.2 Results 
Among the 50 participants in the choice condition, 24 chose Snake A and 26 chose Snake 
B, suggesting that the two images had comparable valence across participants at the 
aggregate level.  
2.2.2.1 Data Preparation 
The IAT measure was scored using the D-600 algorithm (Greenwald, Nosek, & Banaji, 
2003). The score reflects the difference in mean response latency between the two 
combined blocks (block 5 and block 3) divided by the overall variation in those latencies. 
Following Greenwald et al.’s (2003) procedure, two separate IAT indices were calculated 
using the first 20 trials and the last 40 trials of block 3 and 5, respectively. As an indicator 
of internal consistency, the Cronbach’s α of the two subordinate IAT scores was .58. The 
two scores were then averaged to produce a single IAT index, with higher scores 
indicating higher levels of self-object associations for Snake A over Snake B. This index 
was then re-coded to reflect relative self-object associations for the owned versus non-
owned picture using information of which object each participant owned, by random 
assignment or by choice. If a participant owned a picture of Snake A, the original IAT 
index remained unchanged for this participant. If a participant owned a picture of Snake 
B, the original IAT core was reversed for this participant, so that the new score reflected 
the strength of self-object associations of Snake B over Snake A. Higher scores of this 
new index indicate stronger self-object associations for the owned object in relative to the 
non-owned object. As the ownership effect on self-object association was defined as the 
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advantage of the owned object over the non-owned object in self-object associations, the 
new IAT index is in fact a direct indicator of this ownership effect.  
The well-documented block order effect on IAT scores (see Nosek et al., 2005) indicates 
that response latencies in the initial combined block (Block 3) tend to be shorter than 
those in the reversed combined block (Block 5). Because block order was not 
counterbalanced in the current study, the effect of block order was in the same direction 
as the ownership effect for participants who owned the picture of Snake A, whereas the 
order effect was in the opposite direction as the ownership effect for participants who the 
picture of Snake B. However, this block order effect is controlled at the aggregate level 
because of the equal number of participants who owned the picture of Snake A versus 
Snake B in each of the two experimental conditions. Therefore, an IAT score of zero can 
be used as a neutral reference point, such that an aggregated group mean that is 
significantly larger than zero can be interpreted as indicating a significant ownership 
effect on self-object associations. Nevertheless, IAT block order can be a source of 
systematic error variance, and was therefore controlled in all of the following analyses to 
increase statistical power. 
2.2.2.2 Main Analysis 
Results from preliminary analyses indicate that the variable of picture position (left vs 
right) did not influence the outcomes of the following analyses. This variable was 
therefore excluded from the following analyses. The IAT index of self-object associations 
was submitted to a 2 (Ownership Scenario, mere-ownership vs. choice, between Ss) × 2 
(IAT Block Order: owned object paired with the self in the 1st combined block vs. owned 
object paired with the self in the 2nd combined block, between Ss) ANOVA using Model 
1, which is based on unweighted group means and therefore eliminated the effect of 
unequal sample means between groups. The analysis yielded a significant main effect of 
IAT Block Order, F(1, 95) = 53.82, p < .001, ηp2 = .36, indicating faster response 
latencies in the 1st combined block than in the 2nd combined block. More important for 
the current investigation, the ANOVA also revealed a significant main effect of 
Ownership Scenario, F(1, 95) = 5.86, p = .017, ηp2 = .058. No other effects were 
significant, all ps > .05. The means are shown in Table 2.3.  
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Table 2.3. Mean ownership effects on self-object associations in Study 2 
Ownership Scenario 
IAT Block Order 
Owned object-self in  
1st combined block  
Owned object-self in   
2nd combined block 
Mere-ownership 0.38(0.48) -0.25(0.59) 
Choice 0.66(0.35) -0.08(0.40) 
N = 99. Numbers in parentheses are standard deviations. 
As depicted in Figure 2.4, the results are consistent with the prediction, indicating that the 
ownership effect on self-object associations was larger in the choice condition than in the 
mere-ownership condition. Because Levene’s test revealed that error variance of the IAT 
index was did not significantly differ across groups, F (3, 95) = 1.61, p = .19, the 
estimated population standard deviation (SD population = 0.46) was used in the following t-
tests6. Ad-hoc t tests of the unweighted group means for Ownership Scenario revealed 
that the ownership effect was significantly larger than zero in the choice condition, M = 
0.29, t(49) = 4.42, p < .001, 95% C.I. [0.16, 0.42], but not in the mere-ownership 
condition, M = 0.064, t(48) = 0.97, p = .34, 95% C.I. [-0.07, 0.20].  
                                                 
6
 As the t tests were conducted on the basis of the unweighted means, the standard deviations used for the t 
tests are the estimated population standard deviation by the square root of the mean square error term from 
the ANOVA. The same applies to the following studies.  
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Figure 2.4. Ownership effects on self-object associations as a function of ownership 
scenario in Study 2. Error bars represent standard errors.  
2.2.3 Discussion 
The goal of Study 2 was to test the second prediction of the present research, that for 
objects that are incongruent with the self, the ownership effects on self-object 
associations should be moderated by choice. Consistent with the prediction, the results in 
the mere-ownership condition replicated the results of Study 1, while the results in the 
choice condition indicate an ownership-by-choice effect on self-object associations. 
According to the assumptions of the current model, the ownership-by-choice effect in the 
choice condition of the current study indicates the effect of choice-related information 
processing. There is an alternative explanation, however, which is related to a problem 
with the free-choice paradigm (Brehm, 1956) adopted in the choice condition. In this 
paradigm, participants make a choice between two objects before completing measures 
on certain attributes of the two objects (e.g., explicit evaluations, self-object 
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associations). Importantly, when analyzing the responses from the participants, 
researchers use the outcome of each participant’s choice to retrospectively label the two 
objects as either chosen or rejected. Chen and Risen (2010) point out that a problem with 
this practice is that the choice outcomes are not determined by random assignment. 
Instead, they are (imperfect) indicators of the participants’ preferences. In relation to the 
present research, Chen and Risen’s (2010) argument implies the possibility that the 
ownership-by-choice effect on self-object association reflects pre-existing differences in 
self-object congruence between the two objects, instead of the causal effect of choice-
related processing, to the extent that participants tend to choose the object with a 
relatively higher pre-existing level of self-object congruence.  
This possibility further implies a different role of choice than the one assumed in the 
present research. That is, choice is influenced by pre-existing differences in the levels of 
self-object congruence between the two alternative objects, instead of influencing the 
levels of self-object congruence through information processing. As it poses a threat to 
the internal validity of the current study, this alternative interpretation needs to be tested.  
2.3 Study 3: Pre-choice vs. post-choice 
In Study 2, an ownership-by-choice effect on self-object associations was found with 
negative objects as choice alternatives. As mentioned, however, it is possible that this 
effect is caused not by choice-induced differences, but by pre-existing differences, in 
self-object congruence between the chosen object and the rejected object. The goal of 
Study 3 was to distinguish between three accounts of the obtained effects by adopting a 
pre-post between-subjects design, in which self-object associations were measured either 
before participants are introduced to the ownership-by-choice scenario or after they have 
indicated their choices.  
The first account is that the ownership-by-choice effect is driven solely by choice. 
According to this account, the effect should be observed after participants have indicated 
their choices but not before they are introduced to the ownership-by-choice scenario. The 
second account is that the effect is driven solely by differences between choice 
alternatives in self-object congruence that pre-exist before the choice. If this is the case, 
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then the same levels of effect should be observed before participants are introduced to the 
ownership scenario and after they have indicated their choices. The third account is that 
the effect is jointly driven by pre-existing differences between the alternative objects in 
self-object congruence and choice-related processes that further polarized the pre-existing 
differences. According to this account, a stronger effect should be found after participants 
have indicated their choices as compared to before they are introduced to the ownership-
by-choice scenario.  
2.3.1 Method 
2.3.1.1 Participants and design 
A total of 90 participants (50 women, 38 men, 2 unspecified; mean age 20.4 years with 1 
unspecified) were recruited from the subject pool of the Department of Psychology, 
University of Western Ontario for research credit. Data from three participants were lost 
due to computer malfunctions. The study included a single between-subjects factor (Time 
of Measurement, pre-choice vs. post-choice). The dependent variable was the same IAT 
index used in Study 2, which reflected the relative strength of self-object associations of 
one object over another.  
2.3.1.2 Time of measurement 
The two snake pictures from Studies 1 and 2 were used as choice alternatives. In the pre-
choice condition, participants were asked to complete the IAT-based measure of self-
object associations from Study 2 at the very beginning of the study. Because they were 
asked to categorize the two snake pictures during the first block of the IAT measure, 
participants had the opportunity to process the choice alternatives before being measured 
on self-object associations. After completing the measure, they were introduced to the 
choice task adopted from the choice condition of Study 2 and subsequently received a 
print of the chosen picture. In the post-choice condition, participants were first introduced 
to the choice task, which was followed by the IAT measure of self-object associations. 
The position (left and right) of Snake A and Snake B in the choice task was again 
counter-balanced between participants.   
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2.3.1.3 Procedure 
The testing was completed in separate testing rooms, each of which was equipped with a 
single computer. Different from Studies 1 and 2, the study was not combined with any 
other components in a larger battery of studies. After signing informed consent forms, 
participants were randomly assigned to one of the two conditions of Time of 
Measurement: pre-choice or post-choice. They then completed the IAT measure and the 
choice task one after another, with the order of the two depending on the condition. At 
the end of the study, all participants were fully debriefed about the purpose of the study 
and received a 4-inch by 6-inch print-out of the chosen picture along with the research 
credit.  
2.3.2 Results 
In the pre-choice condition, 20 participants chose Snake A and 24 chose Snake B. In the 
post-choice condition, 21 participants chose Snake A and 21 chose Snake B.  
The IAT data were processed in the same way as in Study 2. As an indicator of internal 
consistency, the Cronbach’s α of the two subordinate IAT scores was .55. The two scores 
were averaged into a single IAT score, which was recoded, according to the choice 
outcome of each participant, to a new index that reflects the relative size of ownership 
effect on self-object associations. Results from preliminary analyses indicate that the 
variable of picture position (left vs right) did not influence the outcomes of the following 
analyses. This variable was therefore excluded from the following analyses.  
The IAT index of self-object associations was submitted to a 2 (Time of Measurement, 
pre-choice vs. post-choice, between Ss) × 2 (IAT Block Order: owned object paired with 
self in the 1st combined block vs. owned object paired with self in the 2nd combined block, 
between Ss) Model 1 ANOVA analysis. The analysis yielded a significant main effect of 
IAT Block Order, F(1, 83) = 59.90, p < .001, ηp2 = .42, which was in the same direction 
as that found in Study 2 and indicated faster response latencies in the 1st combined block 
than in the 2nd combined block. Most importantly for the current purpose, the analysis 
yielded a significant main effect of Time of Measurement, F(1, 83) = 4.58, p = .035, ηp2 = 
.052. No other effects were significant, all ps > .05. The means are shown in Table 2.4.  
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Table 2.4. Mean ownership effects on self-object associations in Study 3 
Time of Measurement 
IAT Block Order 
Owned object-self in  
1st combined block  
Owned object-self in  
 2nd combined block 
Pre-choice 0.33(0.36) -0.32(0.34) 
Post-choice 0.44(0.38) -0.10(0.35) 
N = 87. Numbers in parentheses are standard deviations. 
As depicted in Figure 2.5, the results indicate that the level of ownership-by-choice effect 
on self-object associations were stronger for post-choice measurements than pre-choice 
measurements. Because Levene’s test revealed that error variance of the IAT index was 
not significantly different across groups, F (3, 83) = .014, p = 1.00, the estimated 
population standard deviation (SD population = 0.36) was used in the following t-tests. 
Ad-hoc t tests of the unweighted group means of Time of Measurement revealed that the 
mean ownership effect was significantly different from zero in the post-choice condition, 
M = 0.17, , t(42) = 3.09, p = .004, 95% C.I. [0.06, 0.28], but not in the pre-choice 
condition, M = 0.006, t(43) = 1.11, p = .27, 95% C.I. [-0.10, 0.11].   
2.3.3 Discussion 
The results of Study 3 indicate an ownership-by-choice effect on self-object associations 
after participants have indicated their choices, but not before participants were introduced 
to the ownership-by-choice scenario. This finding is consistent with the first account that 
the ownership-by-choice effect is caused by choice and inconsistent with the both second 
account that that the effect was caused by pre-existing differences between the two 
alternative objects in self-object congruence and the third account that the effect was 
caused jointly by choice and the pre-existing differences in self-object congruence.  
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Figure 2.5. Ownership effects on self-object associations as a function of time of 
measurement in Study 3. Error bars represent standard errors. 
The findings from Studies 1, 2, and 3 have supported the imbalance-dissonance principle 
and the balance-congruity principle by showing that while the mere-ownership of a 
negative object cannot, the ownership-by-choice of the negative object can lead to a self-
object association for the object. It is assumed that the latter effect is mediated by choice-
related information processing that creates a certain level of self-object congruence in the 
representation of the negative object. In the previous chapter, two types of choice-related 
information processing----pre-choice and post-choice processing----were discussed. Pre-
choice processing involves evaluating and eliminating choice alternatives in order to 
develop a preference (Brownstein, 2003), while post-choice processing involves re-
evaluations of the choice alternatives or selective exposure to choice-confirming 
information in order to reduce post-choice dissonance (Festinger, 1964). Studies 4 and 5 
were designed to further examine, with negative objects, how certain psychological 
factors pertinent to pre- and post-choice processing influence self-object associations. 
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2.4 Study 4: Self-relevance and ownership effects 
The findings of Studies 2 and 3 suggest that the ownership effect on self-object 
associations found for negative objects is caused by choice. The underlying assumption, 
as specified in Chapter 1, is that information processing during choice changes the 
representations of the alternative objects and leads to higher levels of self-object 
congruence for the chosen object over the rejected object. Two relevant questions can be 
subsequently raised here. First, one may wonder if the degree of the ownership effect on 
self-object associations is contingent on factors that may influence choice-related 
information processing. To the extent that enhanced levels or efforts of information 
processing lead to higher levels of self-object congruence for the chosen object over the 
rejected object, factors that influence information processing should also influence self-
object associations. Second, the individual roles of pre-choice vs. post-choice processing 
on the ownership-by-choice effects are unclear. In Chapter 1, it was argued that, while 
pre-choice processing influences object representations and creates self-object 
congruence, the route through which post-choice processing influences object 
representations and self-object congruence is less clear. Studies 4 and 5 were designed to 
answer these questions.  
The main goal of Study 4 was to examine how factors that influence the level of self-
relevance (Gendolla, 1999; Schmitz & Johnson, 2007) of choice influences self-object 
associations. The main assumption is that when the outcomes of a task are relevant to an 
individual (e.g., with implications for the individual’s self-esteem), he or she tends to be 
more cognitively and emotionally engaged in the task, relative to when the outcomes are 
not relevant to the individual (Graham & Golan, 1991). Although unspecified, the idea of 
self-relevance is inherited in the ownership-by-choice scenario, and during both the pre-
choice period and post-choice period. Recall that, in Studies 2 and 3, participants always 
had prospective ownership of the chosen object before indicating their choices. The 
knowledge and ownership expectation might have enhanced the self-relevance of choice, 
which may further lead to increased efforts of pre-choice processing and, consequently, 
enhanced levels of ownership-by-choice effect on self-object associations. In other words, 
removing participants’ ownership expectation of the chosen object may reduce the levels 
41 
 
of self-relevance during pre-choice processing, and subsequently reduce the ownership-
by-choice effect on self-object associations.  
Also recall that, in Studies 2 and 3, participants were told after they have indicated the 
choice that a copy of the chosen object was reserved for them and they could pick it up 
after the completion of the study. Afterwards, they went on to take the measure of self-
object associations, without actually having physical possession of the chosen object. If 
they have physical ownership of the chosen object after the choice and before completing 
the self-object association measure, they may engage in higher levels of post-choice 
processing, which may lead to enhanced levels of ownership-by-choice effect on self-
object associations.  
In the current study, two factors pertinent to self-relevance of choice: pre-choice 
ownership expectation (ownership expectation hereafter) and post-choice physical 
ownership of chosen object (physical ownership hereafter) were manipulated. It is 
predicted that the both ownership expectation and physical ownership should enhance the 
ownership-by-choice effect on self-object associations.  
2.4.1 Method 
2.4.1.1 Participants and Design 
A total of 154 participants (105 women, 43 men, 6 unspecified; mean age 19.5 with 7 
unspecified) from the subject pool of the University of Western Ontario participated for 
research credit. The study adopted a 2 (Ownership Expectation: with vs. without) × 2 
(Physical Ownership: with or without) between-subjects design. The dependent variables 
included the same IAT used in Studies 2-3 and a new measure of explicit evaluations to 
test the predictions regarding the relative size of the spreading-of-alternatives effect, 
which pertains to evaluations of chosen and rejected objects in classic cognitive 
dissonance research (Festinger, 1964).  
2.4.1.2 Ownership expectation  
Participants first went through a choice task. In the ownership expectation condition, they 
were told that they would receive a gift picture as a special token of appreciation. In the 
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no ownership expectation condition, they were not told about the gift at the beginning of 
the choice task; instead, they were simply told that their task was to evaluate two pictures 
and indicate which one they personally prefer.  
Participants then went through a similar procedure of choice as the one included in 
Studies 2 and 3. The two snake pictures from the previous studies were used as choice 
alternatives. The positions of Snake A and B on the screen (left/right) were 
counterbalanced between participants. When the two alternative pictures were displayed 
on screen for choice, those in the ownership expectation condition were asked which one 
they prefer and want to own, while those in the no ownership expectation condition were 
asked simply which one they prefer. Importantly, after indicating choices, those in the no 
ownership expectation condition were then told that actually that they would receive a 
print of the picture that they just chose as a special token of appreciation. Therefore, 
participants in both conditions were aware of their prospective ownership of the chosen 
object at the end of the choice task, and the effect of ownership expectation was 
constrained, in terms of time frame, to the information processing during pre-choice 
processing. The potential limitation of this setup will be discussed later in this study.  
2.4.1.3 Physical ownership 
After indicating their choice, participants were asked to contact the experimenter. The 
experimenter then followed the participant back to the testing room and asked him/her 
which picture he/she had chosen. In the physical ownership condition, the experimenter 
took a print of the chosen picture and handed it to the participant, asking them to put it 
either in their bags (if any) or on the table facing down so they could not see it during the 
rest of the study. In the no physical ownership condition, the experimenter told the 
participant that a print of the chosen picture would be reserved for them and they could 
get it after the study. The experimenter then left the room and the participant would 
continue the study.  
2.4.1.4 Measures 
The same IAT-based measure as that used in Studies 2 and 3 was included as the measure 
of self-object associations. A measure of post-choice explicit evaluations of the two 
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objects was included as a manipulation check for post-choice physical ownership of the 
chosen object. In Chapter 1, the possibility was discussed that post-choice processing 
may influence explicit evaluations but not self-object associations, as it may not change 
the representations of the choice alternatives. Therefore, an explicit evaluation measure 
can serve as an indicator of the effect of post-choice physical ownership on post-choice 
processing.  
Following the completion of the IAT task, participants were asked to evaluate each snake 
picture on three 6-point semantic differential scales with regard to the dimensions 
attractive/unattractive, unpleasant/pleasant, and terrible/great. The order between the 
IAT-based measure of self-object association and the explicit evaluation measure was not 
counter-balanced, due to the consideration that the performance in the former is unlikely 
to influence that in the latter, whereas the performance in the latter is likely to influence 
that in the former. Specifically, it is argued that the perception of one’s performance in an 
IAT-based measure of self-object association is unlikely to be used by the participants as 
information for evaluative judgments, while evaluations are likely to influence the 
representations of the two objects and activate associations that might further influence 
the performance in an IAT task (Nosek et al., 2005).  
2.4.1.5 Procedure 
The study was run as the first component of a 3-component package. After signing 
informed consent forms, participants were randomly assigned to one of the four 
conditions. They completed the choice task, the IAT task, and the explicit evaluation 
measure in this order, before completing a demographic questionnaire. At the end of the 
study all participants were fully debriefed about the purpose of the study. Those in the 
physical ownership condition received a print of the chosen picture before the IAT task, 
whereas those in the no physical ownership condition received their print at the end of the 
study.  
2.4.2 Results 
Overall, 69 participants chose Snake A and 80 chose Snake B. The breakdown for each 
condition is as follows: 18/19 (choosing Snake A/Snake B, same in the following) in 
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ownership expectation/physical ownership group, 22/19 in ownership expectation/no 
physical ownership group, 12/24 in no ownership expectation/physical ownership group, 
and 17/18 in no ownership expectation/no physical ownership group. The unequal sample 
sizes between those who have chosen Snake A (N = 12) and those who have chosen 
Snake B (N = 24) in the no ownership expectation/physical ownership condition are not 
considered as a concern, as in Model 1 ANOVA, the analyses were based on unweighted 
means that are unaffected by unequal sample sizes between cells.  
The IAT data were processed in the same way as in Studies 2 and 3. Data of 5 
participants were missing due to program malfunctions, resulting in an effective sample 
size of 149. The Cronbach’s α of the two subordinate IAT scores was .53. The two IAT 
scores were averaged and recoded (using choice outcome information) into a new IAT 
index of the relative size of ownership effects on implicit self-object associations.  
With regard to explicit evaluation data, the Cronbach’s α was .82 for the 3 items on 
Snake A and .86 for the 3 items on Snake B. Item scores were averaged for each object, 
and the two resultant explicit evaluation scores were recoded (again using choice 
outcome information) to two explicit evaluation scores for the chosen and rejected 
objects.  
2.4.2.1 Self-object associations 
Preliminary analyses indicated that the position of the two pictures did not influence the 
results of the following analyses and therefore was removed from the analyses. To 
investigate the hypothesized effects of ownership expectation and physical ownership, 
the IAT index was submitted to a 2 (Ownership Expectation, with vs. without, between 
Ss) × 2 (Physical Ownership, with vs. without, between Ss) × 2 (IAT Block Order: the 
owned object paired with self in the 1st combined block vs. the owned object paired with 
self in the 2nd combined block, between Ss) Model 1 ANOVA. The analysis yielded a 
non-significant main effect of Ownership Expectation, F(1, 141) = 1.00, p = .32, ηp2 = 
.007, a non-significant main effect of Physical Ownership, F(1, 141) = 0.004, p = .95, ηp2 
< .001, as well as a non-significant interaction between the two factors, F(1, 141) = 0.88, 
p = .35, ηp2 = .006. All other effects were non-significant as well, all ps > .05, except for 
a significant IAT Block Order effect similar to that found in previous studies, F(1, 141) = 
45 
 
84.25, p < .001, ηp2 = .37. The means and standard deviations are shown in Table 2.5. 
These results were inconsistent with the hypotheses about the moderating effects of 
ownership expectation and physical ownership on the degree of ownership effect.  
Although no moderating effects on ownership-by-choice effects were found, the baseline 
ownership-by-choice effect was replicated, as indicated by the results of a series of ad-
hoc t-tests like the ones performed in Studies 2 and 3. The analyses revealed, first of all, 
an overall ownership-by-choice effect in the sample, indicated by an unweighted grand 
mean that was significantly different from zero, M = 0.20, SD population = 0.38, t(148) = 
6.36, p < .001, 95% C.I. [0.14, 0.26]. Because Levene’s test revealed that error variance 
of the IAT index was not significantly different across groups, F (7, 141) = 1.80, p = .09, 
the estimated population standard deviation was used in the following t-tests. Analyses in 
each condition revealed ownership-by-choice effects in all four groups, indicated by 
unweighted group means significantly different from zero: in the ownership 
expectation/physical ownership group, M = 0.26, t(36) = 4.12, p < .001, 95% C.I. [0.13, 
0.38]; in the ownership expectation/no physical ownership group, M = 0.20, t(40) = 3.40, 
p = .002, 95% C.I. [0.08, 0.32]; in the no ownership expectation/physical ownership 
group, M = 0.13, t(35) = 1.99, p = .04, 95% C.I. [.005, 0.26]; and in the no ownership 
expectation/no physical ownership group, M = 0.20, t(34) = 3.08, p = .004, 95% C.I. 
[0.07, 0.33]. All group means were in the expected positive direction, indicating higher 
levels of self-object associations for the chosen object over the rejected object.  
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Table 2.5. Mean ownership effects on self-object associations in Study 4 
Ownership 
Expectation 
Physical 
ownership 
IAT Block Order 
Owned object-“self”  
in 1st combined block  
Owned object-“self”  
in 2nd combined block 
Yes 
Yes 0.45(.38) 0.062(0.28) 
No 0.56(0.41) -0.16(0.36) 
No 
Yes 0.41(0.32) -0.15(0.45) 
No 0.52(0.31) -0.11(0.44) 
N = 155. Numbers in parentheses are standard deviations.  
2.4.2.2 Explicit Evaluations  
For explicit evaluations, the data of 5 participants were missing due to computer 
malfunctions, resulting in an effective sample size of 144 for the following analysis. 
Explicit evaluation scores were submitted to a 2 (Ownership Expectation, with vs. 
without, between Ss) × 2 (Physical Ownership, with vs. without, between Ss) × 2 (Object 
Status, chosen/owned vs. rejected/non-owned, within Ss) mixed-model ANOVA. The 
analysis yielded a significant main effect of Object Status, F(1, 136) = 116.04, p < .001, 
ηp
2
 = .46, and a significant two-way interaction between Object Status and Physical 
Ownership, F(1, 136) = 9.70, p = .002, ηp2 = .067. No other effects were significant, all ps 
> .05. The results are depicted in Figure 2.6. 
To specify this two-way interaction, tests of simple effects indicated that in the physical 
ownership condition, explicit evaluations of the chosen object (M = 3.67) were 
significantly more positive than explicit evaluations of the rejected object (M = 2.53), 
F(1, 136) = 93.57, p < .001, ηp2 = .41. The same effect occurred in the no physical 
ownership condition, but the difference in explicit evaluations of the chosen object (M = 
3.51) and the rejected object (M = 2.88) was much smaller, F(1, 136) = 30.25, p < .001, 
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ηp
2
 = .18. Taken together, the results suggest that there was a significant ownership-by-
choice effect on explicit evaluations in both conditions of physical ownership, and that 
the effect was larger when participants had physical ownership of the chosen object as 
compared to when they did not. 
 
Figure 2.6. Explicit evaluations of objects as a function of physical ownership and 
object status (chosen vs. rejected) in Study 4. Error bars represent standard errors.  
2.4.3 Discussion 
The main goal of Study 4 was to examine the moderating effect of self-relevance on self-
object associations. Two factors that were assumed to enhance self-relevance: ownership 
expectation and physical ownership were manipulated, but neither was found to influence 
self-object associations. The results, however, did replicate the findings of Study 2 and 3, 
by indicating an ownership-by-choice effect on self-object associations in the entire 
sample as well as in each individual condition.  
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The results on explicit evaluations indicate the same ownership-by-choice effect on 
explicit evaluations, indicated by a higher level of positive evaluations for the chosen 
object than for the rejected object. Interestingly, the ownership-by-choice effect on 
explicit evaluations was moderated by physical ownership, which was found to have no 
moderating effect on the ownership-by-choice effect on self-object associations. This 
implies that explicit evaluations are influenced by mechanisms over and above the ones 
that influence self-object associations. In other words, enhanced explicit preferences of 
the chosen object over the rejected object, as the result of physical ownership, might be 
driven by factors (e.g., extraneous motives) that influence evaluative judgments but not 
the underlying representations of the objects.  
One possibility is that physical ownership leads to enhanced levels of post-choice 
dissonance, which subsequently lead to enhanced ownership-by-choice effect on explicit 
evaluation, an effect similar to the spreading-of-alternatives effect (Brehm, 1956; 
Festinger, 1964). Consistent with the null effect of physical ownership on self-object 
associations, Gawronski and Strack (2004) found that cognitive dissonance influences 
explicit evaluations but not automatic evaluations, implying that dissonance leads to 
changes in evaluative behaviours but not in underlying mental associations.  
It is also possible that physical ownership leads to enhanced motivation of self-
enhancement. According to Beggan (1992), the mere-ownership effect on explicit 
evaluations is driven by the owner’s need to view oneself in a positive light. Physical 
ownership may further enhances the self-enhancement property of ownership, as positive 
evaluations of objects in one’s physical possession may be more self-enhancing than 
positive evaluations of objects that are not in one’s physical possession. Future research 
can identify the exact motivations that underlie the factor of physical ownership and 
influence explicit evaluations of the objects.  
The null (moderating) effects of ownership expectation on both self-object associations 
and explicit evaluations are less interesting. Although a possible explanation is both self-
object associations and explicit evaluations are not influenced by the level of pre-choice 
processing, manipulation failure seems to be a more parsimonious explanation. Due to 
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several reasons, the manipulation of ownership expectation in the current study has 
limitations. First, self-object associations were measured after participants indicated their 
choice, while ownership expectation was assumed to influence pre-choice processing. 
Any event that occurs between the end of pre-choice processing and the self-object 
association measure (e.g., the indication of choice, the manipulation of physical 
ownership) may confound the effects. It would have been ideal to measure self-object 
association after the pre-choice processing and before instead of after the choice. Second, 
as self-object associations were measured after the manipulation of physical ownership, 
there was an unwanted outcome that all participants, regardless of the condition of 
ownership expectation, had knowledge about the prospective ownership at the time of 
measurement. It would have been ideal to keep the ownership expectation constant 
throughout the ownership-by-choice scenario, so that any confound associated with the 
knowledge of prospective ownership can be controlled. These limitations were addressed 
in Study 5.  
2.5 Study 5: The indication of choice 
The goal of Study 5 was two-fold. The first goal was to test the effect of pre-choice 
ownership expectation with a manipulation improved over Study 4’s. In the current study, 
participants either did or did not have ownership expectation throughout the entire study 
instead of before they indicated their choices. In addition, the measures were placed 
either after pre-choice processing and before participants indicated their choices or after 
they had indicated their choices. This manipulation allows for the estimations of the 
independent effects of pre- and post-choice processing.  
The second goal was to further examine the effect of post-choice processing on self-
object association with the focus on a key factor in the cognitive dissonance model—the 
indication of choice. According to the post-choice dissonance model (Festinger, 1957, 
1964), the cognitive element representing the choice is a prerequisite for the experience 
of cognitive dissonance, as no cognitive inconsistency or cognitive dissonance will take 
place if the individuals do not make the choice and therefore not commit to one 
alternative. The indication of choice initiates the experience of cognitive dissonance and 
dissonance-driven post-choice processing. Therefore, any changes of the ownership-by-
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choice effect on self-object associations from right before to after the choice should 
indicate the influence from dissonance-driven post-choice processing.  
Study 5 examined the effects of ownership expectation and the indication of choice on 
self-object associations. As half of the participants did not have ownership of the object 
throughout the study, the term choice effect on self-object associations is used instead of 
ownership-by-choice effect. It was predicted that both the two factors of interest: 
ownership expectation and indication of choice should increase the levels of choice effect 
on self-object association.  
2.5.1 Method 
2.5.1.1 Participants and Design 
A total of 139 participants (94 women, 45 men, mean age 18.9 years with 2 unspecified) 
from the subject pool of the University of Western Ontario participated in the study for 
research credit. The study adopted a 2 (Ownership Expectation: with vs. without) × 2 
(Time of Measurement: post-processing & pre-choice vs. post-choice) between-subjects 
design. The dependent variables were the same as in Study 4: the IAT measure of self-
object associations and explicit evaluations of the two objects.  
2.5.1.2 Ownership expectation 
The manipulation of ownership expectation followed the same procedure as in Study 4, 
except one difference: unlike participants in the no ownership expectation condition of 
Study 4 who gained the knowledge of prospective ownership after the choice, 
participants in the no ownership expectation condition in this study never received any 
information about ownership throughout the study. Instead, their task was to evaluate the 
two objects and indicate which one they personally prefer. In this sense, this condition 
can also be called the mere-choice condition, as participants in this condition merely 
make a choice without owning the chosen object. Otherwise, all procedures and 
instructions of this experimental manipulation were identical to Study 4. The left/right 
positions of Snake A and Snake B was again counter-balanced between participants.  
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2.5.1.3 Measures 
The IAT measure from previous studies and the explicit evaluation measure from Study 4 
were included. The explicit evaluation measure was included as a manipulation check for 
post-choice processing, as shown in Study 4, post-choice processing might influence 
explicit evaluations but not self-object associations.  
2.5.1.4 Time of Measurement 
After all participants spent 20 seconds evaluating the two pictures, they were asked if 
they were ready to indicate their choices. If they reported ready, they were asked to 
continue. If they indicated not ready, they were asked to spend more time to evaluate the 
pictures before indicating their choices. After participants reported ready, those in the 
post-processing and pre-choice condition were told to complete the measures of self-
object associations and explicit evaluations before indicating their choices. Those in the 
post-choice condition were told to indicate their choices before completing the two 
measures. The order of the two measures was fixed for the reasons mentioned in Study 4. 
A deviation to the procedure used in the previous studies was that, after indicating their 
choices, participants in the ownership expectation condition were told by the computer 
program to remember their choice so that they could receive a copy of the chosen object 
and then continued the study by themselves. In previous studies, participants would go 
and find the experimenter who would make a note of the choice outcome and continue 
the study for them.   
2.5.1.5 Procedure 
The study was run as the only component of a battery. After signing informed consent 
forms, participants were randomly assigned to one of the four conditions. Then, they 
were told either to choose a picture as gift or to evaluate two pictures. Half of them 
completed the measures after they indicated that they were ready to indicate their choices 
but before they actually did so, while the other half completed the measures after they 
indicated their choices. Finally, participants completed a demographics questionnaire. At 
the end of the study all participants were fully debriefed about the purpose of the study. 
For the sake of saving prints of pictures and to be consistent with the initial information 
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to participants, only those in the ownership expectation conditions received a print of the 
chosen picture at the end of the study.  
2.5.2 Results 
Overall, 69 participants chose Snake A and 66 chose Snake B. The breakdown for each 
condition is as follows: 17/17 in ownership expectation/post processing and pre-choice 
condition, 20/14 in ownership expectation/post-choice condition, 13/20 in no ownership 
expectation/post processing and pre-choice condition, and 19/15 in no ownership 
expectation/post-choice condition. 
The IAT data were processed in the same way as in previous studies. The Cronbach’s α 
of the two subordinate IAT scores was .50. The two IAT scores were then averaged and 
recoded according to the choice outcome for each participant into a new IAT index of the 
choice effect on self-object associations. For explicit evaluations, the Cronbach’s α was 
.83 for the 3 items on Snake A, and .85 for the 3 items on Snake B. The scores were 
averaged and recoded into two evaluation scores, one for the chosen object and the other 
for the rejected object.  
2.5.2.1 Self-object associations 
Preliminary analyses with Picture Position included as a factor revealed a significant two-
way interaction between Picture Position and Time of Measurement, F(1, 119) = 5.30. p 
= .023, ηp2 = .043, and a significant two-way interaction between Picture Position and 
Ownership Expectation, F(1, 119) = 3.91. p = .050, ηp2 = .032. Because this was the 
first time in 4 studies that effects of Picture Position were found, they most likely reflect 
either (a) Type I errors or (b) incidental stimulus effects that are uninterpretable and 
irrelevant for the main hypotheses of this study. Moreover, the exclusion of the Picture 
Position variable did not change any of the results reported in the following. Therefore, 
the analyses reported here did not include Picture Position as an independent variable.  
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Table 2.6. Mean choice effects on self-object associations in Study 5 
Ownership 
Expectation 
Time of  
Measurement 
IAT Block Order 
Owned-“self”  
in 1st combined block  
Owned-“self”  
in 2nd combined block 
Yes 
Post-processing  
& pre-choice 
0.50(0.26) -0.06(0.34) 
Post-choice 0.46(0.38) -0.02(0.31) 
No 
Post-processing  
& pre-choice 
0.58(0.44) -0.04(0.36) 
Post-choice 0.56(0.39) -0.12(0.37) 
N = 135. Numbers in parentheses are standard deviations.  
The IAT index was submitted to a 2 (Ownership Expectation, with vs. without, between 
Ss) × 2 (Time of Measurement, post-processing & pre-choice vs. post-choice, between 
Ss) × 2 (IAT Block Order: the chosen object paired with self in the 1st combined block vs. 
the chosen object paired with self in the 2nd combined block, between Ss) Model 1 
ANOVA. The analysis yielded a non-significant main effect of Ownership Expectation, 
F(1, 127) = 0.17,  p = .69, ηp2 = .001, a non-significant main effect of Time of 
Measurement, F(1, 127) = 0.18, p = .67, ηp2 = .001, and a non-significant interaction 
between these two factors, F(1, 127) = 0.12, p = .73, ηp2 = .001. In fact, no effects 
reached significance other than a significant IAT Block Order effect, F(1, 127) = 87.98, p 
< .001, ηp2 = .41, which was similar to the block order effect found in previous studies. 
The means and standard deviations are shown in Table 2.6.  
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Although no moderating effects on ownership-by-choice effects were found, the baseline 
ownership-by-choice effect was replicated, as indicated by the results of a series of ad-
hoc t-tests like the ones performed in Studies 2, 3, and 4. Again, the analyses first 
revealed an overall choice effect on self-object associations in the sample, indicated by a 
unweighted grand mean that was significantly different from zero, M = 0.23, SD population 
= 0.36, t(134) = 7.52, p <.001, 95% C.I. [0.17, 0.29]. Because Levene’s test revealed that 
error variance of the IAT index was not significantly different across groups, F (7, 127) 
= .983, p = .45, the estimated population standard deviation was used in the following t-
tests. Subsequent t-tests revealed choice effects in all four groups, indicated by 
unweighted group means that were significantly different from zero: in the ownership 
expectation/post-processing and pre-choice group, M = 0.22, t(33) = 3.65, p < .001, 95% 
C.I. [0.10, 0.35]; in the ownership expectation/post-choice group, M = 0.22, t(33) = 3.59, 
p < .001, 95% C.I. [0.09, 0.34]; in the no ownership expectation/post-processing and pre-
choice group, M = 0.27, t(32) = 4.36, p < .001, 95% C.I. [0.14, 0.40]; and in the no 
ownership expectation/post-choice group, M = 0.22, t(33) = 3.65, p < .001, 95% C.I. 
[0.10, 0.35]. The means were again in the expected positive direction, indicating higher 
levels of self-object associations for the chosen object than the rejected object.  
2.5.2.2 Explicit Evaluations 
Preliminary analyses indicated that Picture Position did not influence the results on 
explicit evaluation and was therefore not included in the analyses. Explicit evaluation 
scores were submitted to a 2 (Ownership Expectation, with vs. without, between Ss) × 2 
(Time of Measurement, post-processing/pre-choice vs. post-choice, between Ss) × 2 
(Object Status, chosen vs. rejected, within Ss) mixed-model ANOVA. The analysis 
yielded a significant main effect of Object Status, F(1, 131) = 87.11, p < .001, ηp2 = .40, 
indicating that explicit evaluations of the chosen object (M = 3.49, SD = 1.20) were more 
positive than explicit evaluations of the rejected object (M = 2.60, SD = 1.10). No other 
effects were significant, all ps > .05.  
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2.5.3 Discussion 
The main goals of Study 5 were to examine the effects of ownership expectation and the 
indication of choice on self-object associations. Contrary to the predictions, neither factor 
was found to influence self-object associations. The results did indicate a choice effect on 
self-object associations in the entire sample as well as in each condition, replicating the 
findings from previous studies.  
Despite the improved manipulation of ownership expectation over Study 4’s, no effect of 
this factor was found on self-object associations and explicit evaluations. On the other 
hand, the results in the no ownership expectation conditions indicate that pre-choice 
processing may lead to the formation of self-object associations even without the 
knowledge of ownership, a finding consistent with the notion that pre-choice processing 
changes the representation of the choice alternatives. 
The finding in the no-ownership-expectation and post-processing/pre-choice condition7 is 
particularly interesting. Because a choice effect was observed when participants did not 
have ownership expectation and before they indicated their preferences, it suggests that 
preference-driven information processing is sufficient for the choice effect on self-object 
associations. This “mere-processing” effect resembles the implicit partisanship effect 
(Greenwald, Pickrell, & Farnham, 2002), where individuals’ mere-processing of the 
names of a group’s members leads to implicit likings and identification of the group, 
even when the individuals have no relation with the group. The finding challenges the 
necessity of ownership propositions in the formation of self-object associations, as 
participants in this particular condition did not have ownership expectation and therefore 
could not have formed ownership propositions. However, it would be premature to 
conclude that propositions are unnecessary in the process of self-object association 
                                                 
7
 Note that in this condition, participants had completed pre-choice processing before they took the 
measure of self-object associations. Therefore, the choice effect found in this condition is more likely to be 
caused by pre-choice processing than by pre-existing differences in self-object congruence between the two 
alternative objects.  
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formation, as participants could have inferred from the choice scenario other types of 
propositions other than ownership propositions. For example, they might draw 
propositional inferences such as “I choose this object”, in which the concept of “I” and 
that of the object are meaningfully related. The role of propositional processes in self-
object association formation needs to be examined in future research.  
No evidence of post-choice processing was found in the study, as the same levels of self-
object association and explicit evaluations were found before and after the indication of 
choice. In other words, there was no post-choice spreading-of-alternatives effect on 
explicit evaluations. This finding speaks against dissonance-driven post-choice 
processing, and indicates that post-choice processing drives the effects of choice on 
explicit evaluations and self-object associations. The absence of post-choice cognitive 
dissonance in the present research may have to do with the negative valence of the choice 
alternatives. Post-choice dissonance may not occur when the choice alternatives are of 
negative valence (e.g., due to a lack of motivation to justify the choice). An important 
goal of future research should be identifying the boundary conditions for post-choice 
dissonance and post-choice processing.  
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3 General Discussion 
The goal of the present research is to understand how ownership influences self-object 
associations: mental associations between the owners’ selves and the owned objects. 
Adopting the structural properties and operating principles of the unified theory 
(Greenwald et al., 2002), it was argued that a key determinant for the formation of self-
object associations is the relation between the representation of the self and that of the 
object. Therefore, in order to understand how ownership affects self-object associations, 
it is important to understand the information processing that takes place in ownership 
scenarios, and how it changes the representation of an owner’s self and that of the owned 
object.  
Two different ownership scenarios: mere-ownership and ownership-by-choice, were 
sampled for this purpose. The mere-ownership scenario represents the type of situation 
where the level of information processing of the alternatives is minimal, so that the 
formation of self-object associations is passively determined by pre-existing levels of 
self-object congruence. The ownership-by-choice scenario, in contrast, represents the 
type of situation where the level of information processing is relatively high, so that the 
formation of self-object associations is influenced by active changes in the 
representations of the choice alternatives caused by choice-related information 
processing. Drawing on these assumptions, it was predicted that self-object association 
formation should be moderated by the levels of self-object congruence or incongruence 
of the alternative objects in the mere-ownership scenario, in that it occurs only when the 
objects are congruent with the self but not when they are incongruent with the self. In the 
ownership-by-choice scenario, however, choosing the owned object should lead to the 
formation of self-object association even when the alternative objects are incongruent 
with the self.  
The findings have supported the predictions. Specifically, findings from Studies 1 and 2 
indicate a moderating effect of valence on self-object associations in mere-ownership 
scenarios, that a mere-ownership effect on self-object associations was found in the 
condition where the alternative objects are of positive valence (i.e., evaluatively 
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congruent with the self) but not when they are of negative valance (i.e., evaluatively 
incongruent with the self). Findings from Studies 2 and 3 indicate moderating effects of 
choice on self-object associations with negative objects as choice alternatives. 
Ownership-by-choice effects, but not mere-ownership effects, were found for negative 
objects. The same ownership-by-choice effect on self-object associations for negative 
objects has been replicated in Studies 4 and 5.  
Although the findings from Studies 4 and 5 fail to indicate any effect from the 
psychological factors of interest (e.g., self-relevance, indication of choice) on self-object 
associations, they still provide interesting insights. The findings from Study 4 indicate 
increased levels of explicit preference of the chosen object over the rejected object 
caused by the physical ownership of the chosen object, which has no effect on self-object 
associations. Drawing on the assumption that the self-object association is determined by 
underlying representations, these findings imply that the certain psychological factors 
(e.g., self-enhancement motivation) that influence explicit judgments do not lead to 
correspondent changes in the underlying representations of the alternative objects. The 
findings from Study 5 indicate that pre-choice processing for the purpose of developing a 
preference, instead of post-choice processing for the purpose of justifying the choice, is 
the main determinant for the formation of self-object associations in the present research, 
at least when the choice alternatives are of negative valence.  
In the following sections of the chapter, the current model of self-object association 
formation will be revisited and several important questions raised during the research will 
be addressed. Then, alternative accounts will be discussed in relation to the current 
findings. The findings will be further discussed in light of the unified theory, dual process 
models of social cognition, choice theories, and other relevant theories. The chapter will 
end with discussions of limitations of the present research, future directions, and practical 
implications.  
3.1 Current model 
The current model of self-object association formation included two steps. The first step 
is the inference of ownership propositions from ownership scenarios. The second step is 
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the formation of self-object associations in the owners’ associative networks under the 
pressure created by the ownership propositions. In the second step, two principles: 
balance-congruity and imbalance-dissonance (Greenwald et al., 2002) guide the 
formation of self-object associations. According to these principles, self-object 
association formation should be facilitated by the level of congruence between the 
owners’ representations of the self and the representation of the object. Not only do the 
findings of the present research support key predictions derived from the current model, 
they also raise important questions that will be addressed in this section.  
3.1.1 Necessity of ownership propositions  
The findings have challenged the notion that ownership propositions are necessary for the 
formation of self-object association. In Study 5, it was found that, even without 
introducing ownership, the evaluations of objects and the indication of one’s preference 
of one object over the other is sufficient to create a choice effect similar to the ownership-
by-choice effect on self-object associations. In other words, neither the knowledge of 
ownership nor the actual ownership of the object is a necessary condition for the 
formation of self-object association. The necessity of the first step of the model, 
therefore, has been challenged.  
There are two responses to this challenge. First of all, just because self-object association 
can be formed in situations that do not involve ownership proposition does not mean that 
ownership proposition does not play a role in the formation of self-object association in 
ownership scenarios. Ownership propositions are embedded in the ownership scenarios in 
the present research, where participants received written instructions about their 
prospective ownership of an object. As long as individuals are aware of their relation 
with the object, there should be ownership propositions (De Houwer, 2014). Hence, 
ownership propositions are an inherent part of the current model. Second, as discussed in 
Study 5, just because ownership propositions are not necessary for the formation of self-
object associations does not rule out the possibility that other types of propositions have 
played a similar role of creating a situational force for self-object association. It remains 
the goal of future research to examine the role of propositions in the formation of self-
object or self-other associations in different types of scenarios.  
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3.1.2 Assessment of self-object congruence and incongruence  
The concept of self-object congruence and incongruence plays a crucial role in the 
current model as the antecedents for the facilitation and inhibition effects, respectively, 
on self-object association formation. An important unanswered question, however, is how 
an object is assessed in terms of its level of congruence or incongruence with the self. 
There are, arguably, two aspects to this question. The first aspect has to do with operating 
principles, that is, the rules or principles that the assessment of self-object congruence 
follows (Gawronski, Strack, & Bodenhausen, 2009; Gawronski, Sherman, & Trope, 
2014). Two types of principles have been defined in Gawronski et al. (2009, also see 
Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2006). Associative principles are characterized by the 
automatic activation of mental representations or evaluative tendencies (e.g., attitudes) 
regardless of whether the persons consider the representations as accurate/inaccurate or 
the evaluations as true/false. Propositional principles, in contrast, are characterized by 
the syllogistic inferences from the inputs of activated mental representations or evaluative 
tendencies, and the assignment of truth values to the inferred propositions. According to 
this framework, the assessment of self-object congruence may follow both principles. A 
feature-matching model (see e.g., Hodges, Bruininks, & Ivy, 2002; Houston, Sherman, & 
Baker, 1991), for example, would suggest that the level of self-object congruence is 
contingent on the amount of features shared between the representation of the object and 
that of the self. This account implies that the assessment of self-object congruence is 
determined by the bottom-up activation of representation of the object and therefore 
guided by associative principles. A hypothesis-testing model (see e.g., Klayman & Ha, 
1987; Snyder & Swann, 1978), in contrast, may suggest that individuals form a priori 
hypothesis about the degree of congruence or incongruence between an object and the 
self. Subsequently, they may engage in selective search for features within the 
representation of the object that confirm this hypothesis. This process, as it starts with a 
propositional hypothesis, follows propositional principles. Instead of being mutually 
exclusive, the two models may each work under specific conditions, and an important 
goal of future research is to identify the exact boundary conditions in which each model 
applies.  
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The second aspect of the question has to do with operating conditions (Gawronski et al., 
2014), that is, whether the assessment of the level of self-object congruence for an object 
operates in a controlled or an automatic manner (Bargh, 1994). If self-object 
congruence/incongruence is determined by the bottom-up activation of the representation 
of the object, then automatic processes may play an important role. Previous research has 
shown that certain properties of the object, such as attitudes (Pratto & John, 1991), 
approach/avoidance tendencies (Cacioppo, Priester, & Berntson, 1993), and mortality 
salience (Amir, Foa, & Coles, 1998) are automatically activated. These properties may 
further facilitate a categorization of the object as either congruent or incongruent with the 
self, which may occur automatically (Smith, Fazio, & Cejka, 1996). If self-object 
congruence/incongruence is determined by top-down hypothesis testing, then 
motivational processes and controlled processes (e.g., biased search for hypothesis-
confirming information, see Kunda, 1990) may be important.  
All in all, in order to understand the operation principles and conditions for self-object 
congruence assessment, it is important for future research to identify the exact processes 
involved. This goal is important not only for the current model, but also for other models 
that rely on similar processes of congruence/incongruence evaluation. Mussweiler 
(2003), in his model of social comparison, proposed that an early step of social 
comparison involves a quick and holistic assessment of the similarity or dissimilarity 
between a target and a standard. This process was described as quick, broad, and relying 
on a small number of features (e.g., category membership and salient characteristics). For 
another example, the model of inductive reasoning (e.g., Heit, 2000) includes a key step 
of the assessment of similarities and dissimilarities between exemplars for the 
determination of whether different exemplars belong to the same category or different 
categories. In both cases, the underlying mechanisms for the judgment of similarity are 
poorly understood. Future research on the operating principles and conditions of self-
object congruence, therefore, can provide insights to various important phenomena of 
social psychology.  
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3.1.3 Operation of the two principles 
The two operating principles—balance-congruity and imbalance-dissonance, according to 
the way they were phrased in the unified theory (Greenwald et al., 2002) and in the 
current model, include antecedent conditions (i.e., self-object congruence or 
incongruence) and outcomes (i.e., the facilitatory or inhibitory effects on self-object 
association formation). It is not clear, however, how the two principles operate. The two 
principles are, by definition, associative principles, as the antecedent conditions are 
defined in terms of pre-existing associative structures and the outcomes are defined in 
terms of changes in the associative network (Greenwald et al., 2002). It can also be 
speculated that the two principles operate in an automatic manner, such as efficiently, 
outside of awareness, and free of intentional control (Bargh, 1994). However, since the 
exact mediating processes between the antecedent conditions and outcomes are not 
specified in the principles, there is room for alternative accounts, which may achieve the 
same input-output functions without relying on the same assumptions as the two 
principles (e.g., assumptions about the structure and operation of the associative 
network). These alternative accounts will be discussed in details in the next section. 
3.2 Alternative accounts 
Three alternative accounts are discussed. The single-process propositional account 
challenges the notion that findings of the current research are mediated by changes in the 
associative network. Instead, it suggests that the findings can be explained by 
propositional processes. The self-enhancement account, on the other hand, challenges the 
assumption that the findings from the ownership-by-choice scenario are caused by 
choice-related information processing and the resultant changes in representations. 
Instead, it suggests that these findings can be explained by self-enhancement motivation. 
Similarly, the psychological reactance account suggests that the findings can be explained 
by the motivation to restore autonomy. These accounts challenge key assumptions in the 
current model with regard to the underlying processes of the formation of self-object 
associations.  
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3.2.1 Single-process propositional account 
The single-process propositional model of associative learning (De Houwer, 2009; De 
Houwer, 2014; Mitchell, De Houwer, & Lovibond, 2009) rejects the idea of associative 
representations and instead proposes that all information, including social knowledge, is 
stored in the form of propositions—beliefs of the status of the environment and the 
world. According to this approach, changes in behaviours (e.g., attitudes) reflect changes 
in underlying propositions. For example, the evaluative conditioning (EC) effect (De 
Houwer et al., 2001) is explained by the propositions about the contingency between the 
conditioned stimulus (CS) and the unconditional stimulus (US), which the individuals 
formed during the experience of CS-US pairings (see De Houwer, 2014). The associative 
accounts of the EC effect (e.g., Sternberg & McClelland, 2012), in contrast, explain the 
effect as mediated by mental associations between the CS and US that are formed as the 
result of CS-US pairings. According to the single-process propositional account, the 
ownership effects in the present research are behavioural effects instead of effects on 
mental associations. These effects can be described as enhanced tendencies to categorize 
the owned object as associated with the self, mediated by ownership propositions such as 
“I own this object” or “I choose to own this object”.  
The main shortcoming of the single-process account is that, in order to explain the 
specific findings of the present research, it needs post-hoc assumptions on (a) how the 
variables of interest (e.g., object valence or choice) influence the specific content of 
propositions, and (b) how the content of propositions influence the behavioural tendency 
to categorize the owned object as a part of the self. For example, in order to explain the 
finding that this tendency is mediated by object valence in the mere-ownership scenario, 
it can be assumed that the owner has propositionally denied the ownership. Denial 
propositions such as “I am given this object but I do not want it” may eliminate the 
tendency to categorize an object as a part of the self. For another example, in order to 
explain the findings that the same tendency was found with negative objects in the 
ownership-by-choice scenario, it can be assumed that the owners infer qualitatively 
different propositions from this scenario as compared to the mere-ownership scenario. 
Propositions such as “I choose this negative object because I prefer it over the other one” 
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may enhance the tendency to categorize an object as a part of the self. Post-hoc 
explanations like these make the single-process propositional account non-falsifiable, as 
any behavioural effect can have a post-hoc propositional explanation. In order for the 
account to generate testable hypotheses about the topics of the present research, there 
needs to be a model that contains a priori defined conditions about (a) how certain 
ownership-related variables influence the content of propositions, and (b) how the 
specific content of propositions influences the tendency to categorize the owned object as 
part of one’s self. The findings of the present research may serve as useful starting points 
towards such a model.  
3.2.2 Self-enhancement motivation 
Beggan (1992) suggested that the original mere-ownership effect—improved explicit 
evaluation of the owned object as compared to the non-owned object—is a function of 
self-enhancement motivation, or in other words, maintaining a positive sense about 
oneself. He also argued that a key to the understanding of the mere-ownership effect is 
the psychological association between the owner and owned object. Therefore, a larger 
ownership effect on self-association may indicate a higher level of self-enhancement 
motivation. This account provides a seemingly reasonable explanation for the finding of 
moderating effect of object valence on self-object associations in the mere-ownership 
scenario: The formation of self-object associations is inhibited in the negative objects 
condition but not in the positive objects condition, because negative objects are less 
effective than positive objects in helping individuals to maintain a positive view of 
themselves. It, however, has problems in explaining the findings in the ownership-by-
choice scenario, as it cannot explain why a negative object is capable of fulfilling the goal 
of self-enhancement when it’s chosen by the individual but not when it is randomly 
assigned to the individual. It should also be pointed out that Beggan’s (1992) mere-
ownership effect was found on explicit evaluations, and that whether or not self-
enhancement motivation influences self-object associations remains an empirical 
question, as indicated by the findings from Study 4.  
Despite the difficulties of the self-enhancement account in explaining the current 
findings, it is still an interesting question how self-enhancement motivation may 
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influence self-object associations, due to the way self-enhancement motivation is 
typically manipulated. In previous research (e.g., Heatherton, Herman, & Polivy, 1991; 
for a review, see Leary, Terry, Allen, & Tate, 2009), a common way of manipulating 
self-enhancement motivation involves the activation of negative contents in a person’s 
self-representation (e.g., providing bogus negative feedback about one’s performance or 
asking a person to recall experience with negative connotations for self-evaluation). 
These so-called “ego-threat” manipulations have been shown to enhance self-
enhancement motivation, which should subsequently drive individuals to own positive 
objects that are arguably more effective for self-enhancement than negative objects. 
However according to the current model, the negative content activated in the active 
representation of the self will increase the level of self-object congruence for negative 
objects. Therefore, such “ego-threat” manipulation should also facilitate the formation of 
self-object association for negative objects. In other words, individuals may be motivated 
to own a positive object but are at the same time more likely to form a mental association 
with a negative object—an interesting dissociation. Future research can further explore 
the dissociation between the “need” to own an object and the mental associations 
between the self and an object.  
3.2.3 Psychological reactance 
According to the psychological reactance theory (Brehm, 1966), individuals tend to have 
an aversive affective response when they perceive a deprivation of freedom due to 
imposed rules. In order to restore their deprived autonomy, the individuals will engage in 
specific thoughts and behaviours such as opposition to the imposed rules, unfavourable 
attitudes toward the imposed behaviours, and unfavourable attitudes toward the source of 
restriction (Buller, Borland, & Burgoon, 1998; Quick & Stephenson, 2008; Dillard & 
Shen, 2005; Miller, Lane, Deatrick, Young, & Potts, 2007). This is particularly relevant 
to the present research in that the mere-ownership scenario involves participants being 
forced to accept a gift. According to the theory, these participants may perceive the entire 
situation as a deprivation of their freedom of choice and experience psychological 
reactance. Accordingly, the moderating effect of valence on the mere-ownership effects 
can be explained by the presumably higher degrees of psychological reactance in the 
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negative objects condition than that in the positive object condition. The moderating 
effect of choice on the mere-ownership effects can be further explained by the lack of 
psychological reactance when participants have the freedom to choose between two 
alternatives.  
These explanations, convincing at the first glance, appear flawed when under scrutiny. 
First, according to the reactance theory, the degree of psychological reactance should be a 
function of the degree of deprivation of freedom and not a function of object valence in 
the mere-ownership scenario. Whether or not object valence in the mere-ownership 
scenario influences the degree of perceived deprivation of freedom remains an empirical 
question. Second, the theory did not specify how psychological reactance may influence 
self-object associations. With this mechanism missing, it is impossible for the 
psychological reactance theory to generate any testable hypotheses about self-object 
association formation. Future research can further explore the role of psychological 
reactance in the mere-ownership scenario, and contribute to theoretical refinements of the 
psychological reactance theory.  
3.2.4 Summary 
The single-process propositional theory, a self-enhancement motivation model, and a 
psychological reactance model were discussed as potential alternative accounts to the 
findings of the present research. As illustrated, these alternative accounts suffer from 
similar problems, as all of them lack a priori defined boundary conditions and effects, and 
therefore rely on specific post-hoc assumptions to explain the current results. In contrast, 
the current model contains a priori defined antecedents and effects, and generates testable 
hypotheses that have been supported by the findings. These are strong reasons to prefer 
the current model over the alternative accounts.  
3.3 Theoretical implications 
3.3.1 Unified theory 
As the current model drew key assumptions from the unified theory (Greenwald et al., 
2002), the findings have supplemented and extended the unified theory in many ways. In 
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the unified theory, an important yet untested assumption was that the associative network 
of social knowledge will resist the formation of an association between two concepts that 
could lead to a concept being associated with both of two bipolar-opposed nodes. This 
prediction is tested in the present research and supported by the finding that for a 
negative object, the formation of self-object association was inhibited, as such an 
association would lead to the exact associative structure described in that assumption.  
Novel experimental designs above and beyond the ones used in the empirical evidence 
for the unified theory (Greenwald et al., 2002) are introduced. Previous studies cited in 
support of the unified theory involved a complex correlational design called balanced 
identity, in which association strengths are measured instead of being manipulated. Had 
the same balanced identity design been adopted in the studies of the present research, it 
would involve (a) the examination of a triad of concepts that include the self, the owned 
object, and the attribute of valence; (b) the measurement of the three associations that 
link all pairs of the three concepts; (c) manipulation of object valence, so that subjects are 
expected to vary in the valence of their owned object, and (d) use of statistical tests for 
predicted patterns of how varying degree of object valence influences the three 
associations simultaneously. As compared to this highly complex design, the 
experimental designs used in the present research were kept simpler and more 
straightforward, in that they involved (a) direct manipulations of the key boundary 
conditions (balance-congruity and imbalance-dissonance) of the unified model and (b) 
measures that directly tap into the strength of mental associations between selves and 
objects.   
The present research also expanded the unified theory (Greenwald et al., 2002) in the 
methods through which two incongruent concepts may form an association. According to 
the unified theory, the only situation in which two incongruent concepts can be associated 
is when there are sustained or repeated influences from the environment. Such 
associations, once formed, will lead to an adaptive change in the associative structure 
called “differentiation” (p.6). To illustrate this, recall the example in which a person’s 
cousin was married to a former criminal. The forced association between the person and 
the former criminal will lead to the concept representing the former criminal to split into 
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two subconcepts: one as the spouse of cousin and one as a former criminal. One 
subconcept: the spouse of cousin is associated with positive valence as well as with the 
person’s self, while the other: a former criminal is associated with negative valence but 
not with the person’s self. 
The current model suggests that another way to form an association between two 
incongruent concepts is through active changes in the representation of concepts, a 
process that resembles the process of reappraisal in emotional regulation (Gross, 2002). 
An example can be seen in Finch and Cialdini’s (1989) study, where participants, after 
being told that they shared the same birthday with a notorious dictator, indicated 
improved positive attitudes towards the dictator. According to the current model, the 
shared birthdays have changed the participants’ representations of the dictator in a way 
that increased the level of congruence between the participants’ selves and the dictator. 
The resultant association between participants’ selves and the dictator may have further 
mediated the positive attitudes towards the dictator through automatic valence 
transference.  
Finally, the notion that the formation of an association between two concepts depends on 
the active representations of the two concepts has interesting implications for and beyond 
the unified theory (Greenwald et al., 2002). It implies an associative network that is more 
flexible and dynamic as compared to the one specified in the unified theory, as the mental 
association between two concepts is determined by constructive activations of stored 
representations of the concepts, instead of by the stored representations per se.  
3.3.2 Dissonance model 
When it comes to the post-choice dissonance model (Festinger, 1957, 1964), it is 
important to note that the signature finding for post-choice dissonance: post-choice 
spreading-of-alternatives on explicit evaluations, was not found in Study 5. The findings 
indicate that the effects are driven by pre-choice processing, while no evidence was found 
on the role of post-choice processing in changing self-object associations. However, the 
possibility that post-choice processing influences self-object associations cannot be ruled 
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out, as the null findings might be associated with specific settings of the present research, 
such as the inclusion of negative objects as choice alternatives.  
It remains an interesting question whether or not biased post-choice processing can 
influence self-object associations at all. As discussed in Chapter 1, post-choice cognitive 
dissonance (Festinger, 1957, 1964) can lead to two forms of post-choice processing: re-
evaluations of the choice alternatives and selective exposure to information about 
positive aspects of the chosen object and negative aspects of the rejected object. It is 
possible that selective exposure to choice-confirming information can change the 
representations of the choice alternatives and subsequent changes in self-object 
associations. Because participants in the present research were never offered the 
opportunity of selective exposure, the possibility needs to be examined in future research 
by providing participants with additional information about the positive and negative 
aspects of the alternative objects. If, in this case, the participants indicate a stronger 
ownership-by-choice effect, then the findings will provide support for the role of post-
choice processing and for the classic post-choice cognitive dissonance model.  
3.3.3 Choice Theories  
The current findings have supported the notion that choice has the property of expressing 
thoughts, preferences, and identities (Kim & Sherman, 2007; Tafarodi, Mehranvar, 
Panton, & Milne, 2002). They suggest that not only can choice integrate an object into a 
person’s representation of self, it can also stamp a personal mark on the representation of 
the object. The findings also highlight the effects of pre-choice processing in terms of 
changing the choice makers’ representations of the alternative objects. However, they are 
silent about whether or not the pre-choice processing is biased, that is, driven by the 
specific goal to favour one object over the other (Brownstein, 2003). The possibility that 
such biases exist and influence the findings of the current study cannot be ruled out.  
An interesting question is whether or not the pre-choice processing of unattractive 
alternatives is different from the pre-choice processing of attractive alternatives. It is 
possible, for example, that the choice between two attractive alternatives may involve a 
strategy of maximizing attractive features, which corresponds to a frame of maximizing 
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gains. In contrast, the choice between two unattractive alternatives may involve a strategy 
of minimizing unattractive features, which corresponds to a frame of avoiding losses 
(e.g., Tversky & Kahneman, 1986). Fischer, Jonas, Frey, and Kastenmüller (2008) found 
that participants who had made a gain-framed decision tended to engage in stronger 
biased post-choice information processing than those who had made a loss-framed 
decision. They suggested that gain-framed decisions are made with increased subjective 
decision certainty that increases biased post-choice processing. If a choice between two 
negative objects involves a loss-framed decision, then the findings by Fischer et al. may 
explain the absence of evidence for post-choice processing in Study 5. Future research 
can further investigate the relation between object valence, type of framing, and choice-
related information processing.  
3.4 Limitations and future directions 
3.4.1 Object content 
The use of animal pictures as positive and negative objects was inspired by several 
considerations. First, the category of objects needed to be controlled between different 
conditions. Pictures of animals represented an ideal example in this regard because it was 
relatively easy to identify animal pictures of positive and negative valence in the IAPS. 
Second, the cover story for the ownership scenarios (i.e., giving out a printed picture as a 
special gratitude of the participants’ participation) had to be plausible, especially in the 
conditions where the alternatives are negative objects. Toward this end, participants were 
told that two alternative pictures were randomly selected from a collection called “Nature 
and Wild Life”. Otherwise, it would have made little sense to give participants a snake 
picture (or any picture of negative valence) as a free gift.  
The content of pictures may limit the generalizability of the current findings. Snake 
pictures contain features beyond negative valence, such as mortality salience (see Koole 
& Van den Berg, 2005), which have limited their representativeness as negative objects. 
Specifically, the mortality salience of snakes can trigger psychological processes over 
and above those triggered by general negative objects, such as ugly buildings. The 
research on terror management theory (e.g., Pyszczynski, Greenberg, & Solomon, 1999) 
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has shown that stimuli with mortality salience can trigger defense mechanisms, such as 
the automatic motivation to suppress the evoked death thoughts. How these defense 
mechanisms may influence the formation of self-object association remains an empirical 
question. From a different perspective, however, mortality salience could have increased 
the level of self-object incongruence for the snake pictures and therefore enhanced the 
construct validity of the present research. Future research needs to test the 
generalizability of the findings to other types of positive and negative objects.  
3.4.2 Significance of choice 
In the present research, participants in the ownership-by-choice scenario were asked to 
choose between two animal pictures as a gift. Despite the prospective ownership, most 
participants might have perceived the scenario as a trivial one, given the lack of value of 
the gift and the lack of importance of the situation. On the one hand, the fact that reliable 
ownership-by-choice effects were found despite the possibly low levels of choice 
significance can be viewed as supporting evidence for the validity of the obtained effects. 
On the other hand, the possibly low levels of choice significance could have limited the 
current research in certain ways. First of all, it might have limited the depth of 
information processing during choice. In the current model, it was assumed that that 
choice-related information processing involves the search for evaluation standards within 
one’s self-system as well as the examination of the choice alternatives along these 
standards. Therefore, the more significant the choice, the more likely the individuals will 
look into their own self-system for standards as well as examine the choice alternatives 
thoroughly along these standards, which should further lead to higher levels of self-object 
congruence for the chosen object. Secondly, it might have contributed to the null effects 
of ownership expectation and the indication of choice in Study 5. It is possible that the 
insignificance of the choice has led to a floor effect for ownership expectation, as well as 
the absence of post-choice dissonance and post-choice processing. After all, why should 
participants feel dissonant about such a trivial choice? If the choice outcome is more 
significant (e.g., by using a gift of higher value), the effects of certain psychological 
factors on self-object associations might become more identifiable. Future research is 
needed to test this possibility.   
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3.4.3 Valence vs. congruence 
In the present research, the focus on object valence as a determinant of self-object 
congruence and incongruence has led to the functional equivalence between 
positive/negative valence and the congruence/incongruence with the self, respectively. 
The underlying assumption was that for most participants, positivity is included in the 
representation of the self. One may question, accordingly, whether the findings are driven 
by object valence or by self-object congruence. In order to empirically address this 
question, future research needs to recruit samples of individuals with chronic negative 
representations of the self (e.g., those with low self-esteem), which is difficult according 
to previous research. A more practical way is to change individuals’ active 
representations of the self through experimental procedures such as bogus feedback of 
failure (Heatherton et al., 1991), selective retrieval (e.g., Peters & Gawronski, 2011), or 
priming methods (see Wheeler et al., 2005). 
3.4.4 Value of self-object association 
As the present research is focused on self-object association, one may wonder to what 
extent this construct is relevant for other psychological processes and behaviours. First, 
the formation of self-object associations is information for the formation of other types of 
associations within the associative network specified in the unified theory (Greenwald et 
al., 2002). Therefore, the findings on self-object association formation are informative to 
the understanding of a variety of topics such as attitudes, stereotypes, and self-esteem 
from an associative network perspective. Second, just as self-other associations predict 
marital satisfaction, relationship commitment, and psychological well-being (Aron, Aron, 
& Smollan, 1992), self-object associations may predict important psychological factors 
with regard to objects, such as brand loyalty, consumer satisfaction, or purchasing 
decisions. An important direction of future research should be to explore the behavioural 
effects of self-object associations.  
3.4.5 Effects of ownership on self  
The previous discussion on valence transference has been focused on the transference 
from the self to an associated object, while theoretically it is possible to happen in the 
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other direction: from an associated object to the self. An association with a positive 
object should lead to enhanced positive feelings towards the self, while an association 
with a negative object should lead to a detrimental effect on the positive feelings towards 
the self. Moreover, ownership of positive and negative objects may also cause 
motivational effects, which may influence the owner’s explicit evaluations of the self. For 
example, owning a positive object may boost one’s positive image, while owning a 
negative object may pose an ego-threat and lead to enhanced motivation for self-
enhancement. Future research needs to explore the effects of ownership on the owner’s 
both explicit and automatic evaluations of the self.  
3.5 Real-world Implications  
3.5.1 The psychology of ownership 
The distinction between ownership propositions and self-object associations may have 
interesting real-world implications. Drawing on a parallel distinction between evaluative 
judgments and gut feelings from the APE model (Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2006), it is 
possible for people to have factual ownership of an object yet feel a sense of 
disconnection with the object. A straightforward example is a person receiving a gift that 
he or she does not like (e.g., a fan of Mazda receives a Toyota car as a birthday gift). The 
current findings further indicate that the search for likeable features within this object 
(e.g., looking for Mazda features within the Toyota), however, may reduce the feeling of 
disconnection and increase the feeling of connection. Future research can examine (a) 
whether or not individuals have conscious access to self-object associations, (b) the 
dynamic interactions between perceived ownership and self-object association, and (c) 
the processes through which individuals cope with the tension between perceived 
ownership of an object and the feeling of disconnection towards the object.  
3.5.2 Evaluation vs. association 
The present research also implies a distinction between positive evaluation and self-
object associations. The positive or negative feelings about the object might be 
independent with the extent to which an object is a part of one’s self. For example, when 
visiting a museum, a person may judge a painting as good looking, yet at the same time 
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feel disconnected with the painting as certain features of it (e.g., the subject, the color, 
etc.) are incongruent with the person’s self. A person may also feel inexplicably 
connected with a painting that looks bad, as certain aspects of the painting resembles 
certain aspects of the person’s self. The two concepts: liking and self-object association 
may lead to distinct affective and behavioural outcomes, which may provide directions 
for future research.  
3.5.3 Value of choice 
The current findings imply that even a choice between disliked objects can lead to a 
feeling of connection with, and improved attitude towards, the chosen object. This notion 
has interesting implications for marketers. It might be a useful strategy to integrate the 
component of choice into marketing messages, especially when considering the 
possibility that the perceivers may not like the products or the messages. This strategy 
can arguably elevate the perceivers’ sense of control, increase their levels of information 
processing of the alternative products or marketing messages, and enhance the mental 
associations between their selves and the relevant products.  
3.5.4 Self-regulation 
Finally, the present research may provide insights on how individuals manage the 
negative aspects of their selves. It is possible that people behave differently towards 
negative objects or concepts integrated with their selves than similar objects or concepts 
that are not parts of their selves. For example, previous research has found that people 
like their own body odours while finding others’ body odours repelling. How people 
manage the negative aspects of themselves might be an interesting topic for researchers 
who are interested in the dynamics of the self-system.  
3.6 Conclusions 
The present research is the first to examine one of the oldest types of human-object 
relation—ownership—from the one of the latest perspectives in social psychology—implicit 
social cognition. Utilizing the classic mere-ownership paradigm, the free-choice 
paradigm, and reaction-time based measures, the studies tested boundary conditions for 
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self-object association formation in two types of ownership scenarios: mere-ownership 
and ownership-by-choice. As discussed, the theoretical model and empirical findings of 
the present research have shed light on a variety of topics and theories in social 
psychology, as well as suggested new paradigms and measures for future studies. The 
discussion of the findings has also raised interesting questions for future research on the 
psychology of ownership, self, or other topics such as consumer behaviours. As a real-
world implication, the findings suggest that it might be a good idea to provide people 
with options, especially when there is a chance that they might not like the options they 
are provided with. After all, when Mazda lovers can only choose between a Honda and a 
Toyota, they may still end up feeling connected to the ones that they chose.  
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